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Section II:
The Encounter between Strindberg and Nietzsche 
Chapter 4: The Impossibility of Influence or  
How the Story Has Been Told 
The significance of this encounter between Nietzsche and Strindberg falls 
along the fault lines of contemporary theoretical discourse. Questions 
concerning modernity and particularly the collision between religious 
and secular discourse emerge when we examine aspects of Strindberg’s 
protean production through the prism of Nietzsche’s thought. The prob-
lem of what it means to be a being in the flow of time is highlighted in the 
two men’s work by the collision between two distinct ways of experienc-
ing time: a linear, eschatological temporal construction and a circular, 
subjective experience of chronology. This collision expresses a modern, 
tragic view of existence. An understanding of tragedy refracted through a 
modernist lens shows itself to be the cornerstone of Nietzsche’s philoso-
phy and the basis for Strindberg’s understanding of the self. 
 While the importance of the relationship between Nietzsche and 
Strindberg has elicited some interest, there is no comprehensive inquiry 
into the confluence of these aspects of their thought. There are a few 
sections of a few books that attempt to determine Nietzsche’s influence 
on Strindberg, and all have concluded that the influence is minimal so 
the subject is of little importance.1 Instead, I argue that the significance of 
Nietzsche’s encounter with Strindberg resounds within the discourse of 
modernity, and furthermore, Nietzsche provides us with a theoretical 
explanation of Strindberg’s notion of subjectivity while Strindberg con-
sciously experiments with the fictional possibilities of Nietzsche’s 
thought.
 It is a bit puzzling that Strindberg’s encounter with Nietzsche has 
been largely glossed over, considering the place that the former holds in 
the history of modern drama. Perhaps this is explained by the inaccessi-
bility of the bulk of Strindberg’s prose works to a reader who cannot read 
Swedish, but in any case, even those who can read the language have 
relegated the encounter to an insubstantial moment. It is my belief that 
————
1  In recent years, there seems to be a renewed interest in the encounter. 
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this scholarly neglect comes from a reliance on a rather fruitless analytical 
model. For the Swedish and German scholarship on the encounter has 
used a critical model based on notions of influence that has failed to 
register the importance of the commonalities in Strindberg and 
Nietzsche’s work. I part company from this tradition. 
 Both the primary sources typically used to tell the story of the encoun-
ter between August Strindberg and Friedrich Nietzsche and the history of 
the scholarship which reconstructs this narrative present us with a quan-
dary. How is one to read the seemingly contradictory statements made by 
the Swede about the effect that the philosopher had on his life and work? 
The information available to make this determination is indeed limited. 
The effect of the encounter is generally viewed as being defined by an 
exchange of correspondence and books. The letters between the two men 
are few in number and span a mere month and a half. Nietzsche was 
institutionalized shortly thereafter. Nonetheless, most scholars have re-
lied on this correspondence and a thematically structured sample of 
Strindbergian texts to recount this tale and determine its significance. 
This has led to two lines of thought in the scholarship on the subject 
whose conclusions seem to merge: one which claims that the encounter 
was of little literary significance, the other which engenders a scholarly 
preoccupation with influence. As Nietzsche’s productive life ended 
shortly after his last letter to Strindberg, interpreters of the encounter 
have turned to Strindberg’s own statements about Nietzsche’s influence 
on his work, and an analysis of a basic set of Nietzschean themes in 
Strindberg’s work from the ensuing period. They have found Strindberg’s 
statements to be contradictory and his utilization of the Nietzschean 
themes to show an inadequate understanding of the philosopher’s 
thought. As a result, the general conclusion is that Nietzsche’s influence 
on the Swede was rather trivial and that Strindberg exerted no influence 
at all on the German. While the first line of thought starts out from a 
psychological principle by claiming that Strindberg suffered from a sense 
of growing isolation and an acute inferiority complex, the second uses a 
textual base, searching for thematic congruity, and deems Strindberg to 
have misread and misappropriated the Nietzschean motifs of the Über-
mensch and der Wille zur Macht. In either case, the contradictory state-
ments by Strindberg are smoothed out by positing that either he was on 
his way to the breakdown of his Inferno crisis or he was resistant to the 
influence of a more radical thinker. 
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A Survey of the Scholarship: How the Story Has Been Told 
The first prominent treatment of the encounter between Nietzsche and 
Strindberg appeared as an appendix to Torsten Eklund’s 1948 disserta-
tion, Tjänstekvinnans son, en psykologisk Strindbergsstudie.2 Focusing 
on the notion of the Übermensch, Eklund allowed that the contact with 
Nietzsche might well have hastened Strindberg’s development, but he 
posited that the philosopher’s work had little or no significant impact on 
Strindberg’s literary production as a whole. He substantiated his claim by 
stating that Strindberg’s conception of the Übermensch was much too 
intellectual to have derived out of a direct influence from Nietzsche. He 
traced the Strindbergian inflection of this Nietzschean figure, with its 
most prominent example given as Axel Borg3 through Max Nordau.4
Rejecting Strindberg’s reading of the philosopher as being too alien, 
Eklund took refuge in an analysis of the psychological predisposition 
which engenders this very concept: »Går man till botten med 
Nietzscheanismen, både hos mästeren själv och hos hans lärjungar, skall 
man överallt finna en likartad psykologisk bakgrund: en ömtålig 
diktarsjäl som med kränkt självkänsla tvingats att svälja orättvisor.« (If 
one goes to the roots of Nietzscheanism, one would find in both the mas-
ter and his apprentices a fragile poetic soul, who must swallow injustice 
with wounded pride.)5
 His conclusion can be summed up as follows: Strindberg’s isolated 
position within the Scandinavian literary community occasioned an infe-
riority complex that left him predisposed to receive the work of the phi-
losopher with enthusiasm. This enthusiasm, however, resulted in a feeling 
of compensation for the treatment he felt himself to have suffered at the 
hands of his contemporaries. His intellectual development was con-
firmed, perhaps accelerated, but not changed by his contact with 
Nietzsche.6 Eklund’s argument depends on the opposition between the 
————
2  EKLUND: 1948.
3  Inspector Axel Borg is the main character in Strindberg’s novel, I havsbandet (By 
the Open Sea).
4  Max Nordau was a medical doctor, the author of Entartung, an early Zionist, and 
one of Nietzsche’s harshest critics. 
5  EKLUND: 1948, 369. My translation. 
6  Martin Lamm, referring to Eklund, articulated this position well. He wrote: »Kan-
ske borde man snarare säga att han [Strindberg] framförallt påverkad av Nordau – 
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notions of application and misapplication. In a stance that is quite simi-
lar to Heidenstam’s conception of his naturalism, Strindberg is said to 
have misread his own Nietzscheanism. 
 In 1956, Harald Borland published his dissertation: Nietzsche’s Influ-
ence on Swedish Literature – With Special Reference to Strindberg, Ola 
Hansson, Heidenstam, and Fröding. There is not much that differenti-
ates Borland’s reading of the encounter from Eklund’s analysis. He ar-
gues that: 
The suddenness and violence of the Strindberg-Nietzsche encounter in 1888
tend to make the other events in Strindberg’s life and literary production in the 
eighties jolt out of perspective; it is very tempting to regard Strindberg as a pre-
destined Nietzschean passing through a period of unconscious initiation. But it 
is truer to say that he was moving towards his own form of violent individual-
ism.7
Borland reasons that Nietzsche became a justification for Strindberg’s 
ideological turn, a turn that has primarily a psychological significance. If 
in Eklund’s view this psychological dimension was the projection of a 
compensatory defense mechanism, for Borland, the issue was the justifi-
cation of an earlier shift to an individualistic ideology. 
 The Norwegian scholar Harald Beyer’s Nietzsche og Norden was 
published in 1958. There is a chapter on Strindberg in the second volume 
of this extensive treatment of Nietzsche’s reception in Scandinavia. 
Beyer’s analysis is based more on literary texts than either Eklund’s or 
Borland’s work, but this is less dissimilarity than a matter of emphasis. If 
Eklund analyzed Strindberg’s psychological predisposition and supported 
his thesis by showing Strindberg’s misreading of Nietzsche, and Borland 
built his argument on Eklund’s evidence only to de-personalize his find-
ings by moving from Eklund’s claim to have access to Strindberg’s inter-
nal state to a public justification, then Beyer used a survey of texts to 
make the same claim; Strindberg’s Übermensch was not Nietzschean, but 
what he calls an »intelligensaristokraten« (intelligence aristocrat).8 Beyer 
————
såsom Ekelund visat – föregripit sin egen Nietzscheanism.«(Perhaps one ought to 
sooner say that he [Strindberg], particularly influenced by Nordau – as shown by Ek-
lund – anticipated his own Nietzcheanism.) My translation. Citation found in LAMM:
1948, 173.
7  BORLAND: 1956, 24.
8  BEYER: 1959, 58. The term Intellegence aristocrat was first used by Bengt Lindfors 
in 1908.
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concludes that with the writing of both I Havsbandet (By The Open Sea)
and an essay on Voltaire, »kulminerte Nietzsche-perioden i Strindbergs 
liv« (the Nietzschean period in Strindberg’s life culminated).9 Beyer’s text 
based analysis limits Nietzsche’s influence even further: to a period of less 
than two years. 
 Horst Brandl’s Persönlichkeitsidealismus und Willenskult. Aspekte 
der Nietzsche-Rezeption in Schweden10 is the main German contribu-
tion to the scholarship. He begins with a critique of Borland and Beyer’s 
work, with his main complaint being the inadequate level of abstraction 
in both men’s analyses. Beyer is criticized for not defining the terms of his 
analysis of reception, and Borland is taken to task for not showing how 
Nietzsche was used in the poetic production of the authors under his 
analysis. Brandl’s own analysis starts out by tracing the notion of the 
individual in Sweden. Nietzsche entered the scene at a time when there 
was a revolt against the established bourgeois notion of the individual, a 
conception influenced by both Geijer and Boström who were in turn 
influenced by German Idealist Philosophy. His thesis that the fascination 
with Nietzsche in Swedish intellectual and artistic circles has its basis in 
»[d]ie Diskrepanz, die Nietzsche zwischen offizieller Kultur und dahinter 
sich verbergender politischer, sozialer und ökonomischer Realität auf-
deckt« (the discrepancy between official culture and the hidden political, 
social and economic reality, which Nietzsche uncovers),11 is compelling, 
but fails to explain why such disillusionment would not lead to a socialist 
or anarchist solution (to which Strindberg had been previously disposed) 
or any turn away from a stable notion of received truth rather than an 
intensified cult of individuality. 
 Brandl’s treatment of Strindberg’s encounter with Nietzsche does not 
differ much from the others. As for Strindberg, Brandl’s analysis empha-
sizes a different aspect of his reception of Nietzsche, but once again the 
results of his investigation resemble Beyer’s12: Nietzsche represented a 
————
9  BEYER: 1958, 83. My translation.
10  See BRANDL: 1977.
11  Ibid., 30. Brandl relies here on AHLSTRÖM: 1947, and footnotes his source. Transla-
tion mine. 
12  BRANDL: 1977, 42–43, writes: »Nietzsche kann Erfahrungen, die Strindberg schon 
gemacht hat, allenfalls bestätigen oder verstärken. Auf seinen neuen Weg wird Strind-
berg nicht gewiesen. Seine Distanzierung von Nietzsche setzt denn auch schon bald 
danach, etwa ein Jahr später, ein. Zur Bekräftigung seiner Einsicht in das Untermensch-
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»Durchgangsstadium« (transitional stage) in Strindberg’s development. 
Brandl, however, makes an interesting point whose one-sidedness holds 
the key to understanding how to address an encounter, which has hereto-
fore been written off as being of little importance. In his article, Skandi-
navische Aspekte der Nietzsche-Rezeption, Brandl writes: »Strindberg 
behält auch in Phasen scheinbarer Monomanie Distanz zu sich selbst. 
Seine wenigen Briefe an Nietzsche – vier an der Zahl –, die enthusiasti-
sche Bekenntnisse enthalten, vermitteln zugleich den Eindruck der Dis-
tanz zum Adressaten wie zu sich selbst.« (Strindberg maintains an 
apparent distance to himself even in phases of monomania. His few let-
ters to Nietzsche – four in number –, which contain enthusiastic confes-
sions give the impression of distance both to the Addressee and to 
himself.)13
 His claim is based on a reading of the correspondence that does not 
allow for a contextualization of the Strindberg-Nietzsche correspondence 
through an analysis of the letters that they wrote to others about each 
other. In this way, a rather telling error is made. First, the fascination 
with influence disallows an analysis of the epistemology of Nietzsche’s 
correspondence, as it is assumed that the effect of the encounter was one-
sided. Though Nietzsche produced no work after the encounter, his let-
ters to others about Strindberg reveal how he received and processed the 
Swede’s work. Secondly, while it is impossible to determine whether 
————
liche des ›übermenschlichen‹ Individualisten verweist er dann Mitte der neunziger Jahre 
warnend auf Nietzsche.« Six years later in an article entitled Skandinavische Aspekte 
der Nietzsche-Rezeption, published in Nietzsche-Studien 12, Brandl writes: »Im ganzen 
läßt sich nicht davon reden, Strindbergs Denken wäre unter dem Einfluß Nietzsches 
qualitativ verändert worden.« (BRANDL: 1983, 417).
13  Ibid. Translation mine. Interestingly enough, this postulation is echoed by the 
Swedish scholar Gunnar Brandell. In his three-volume Strindberg biography, BRANDELL
(1985, 226) writes: »Nu infaller också den berömda korrespondensen med Nietzsche som 
börjar i förvirring och slutar med vansinniga utrop på grekiska och latin. Nietzsches 
dårskap visade sig äkta, medan Strindbergs var låtsad, och kontakten som sådan had 
mest symbolvärde.« (Now began the famous correspondence with Nietzsche, which 
started in confusion and ended with insane exclamations in Greek and Latin. 
Nietzsche’s madness proved to be genuine, while Strindberg’s was pretense, and the 
contact as such had mostly symbolic value.) My translation. Brandell conceptualizes a 
notion of real and feigned madness. The methodology here is problematic: the claim that 
Nietzsche’s letters have a mimetic value proven by his institutionalization early in the 
next year and that Strindberg’s letters are merely symbolic creates a methodological 
claim that Nietzsche as person equals his text and Strindberg’s text remains to be inter-
preted as text. 
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there was any change in Nietzsche’s thinking as a result of the encounter, 
a reading of both men’s letters illuminates a commonality, a mode of 
valuation that can be traced philosophically through Nietzsche’s state-
ments about naming and das Pathos der Distanz. This is congruent with 
Strindberg’s negotiation of his past throughout his authorship. 
 The encounter between Nietzsche and Strindberg informs us about a 
process of subject formation; the issue of influence is impossible to nego-
tiate. Facing this dilemma, the canonical scholarship on the subject has 
instead been about the impossibility of influence. The fascination with 
influence blinds these readers to the notion of a commonality, which I 
believe that both men recognized. This salient issue in the encounter 
between Nietzsche and Strindberg is a matter of process and not influ-
ence, or put in the Nietzschean terms, a matter of form and not content.14
 It is my contention that the scholarship to date has not treated the 
significance of the dynamic of proximity and distance in Strindberg’s 
reception of Nietzsche, nor has it considered the same phenomenon in 
the philosopher’s reception of Strindberg’s work. As we saw in our analy-
sis of Hamsun’s »Strindberg,« this movement was representative of an 
internalization process of a weakened truth claim that was intrinsic to 
Strindberg’s engagement with his intellectual influences. On the fourth of 
December in 1888, Strindberg wrote: 
Eget att jag nu genom Nietzsche finner systemet i min galenskap att »opponera 
mot allt«. Jag omtaxerar och sätter nya värden på gamla saker! Det har man ej 
förstått. Knappt jag sjelf. 
————
14  Influence-based analyses of the encounter have attempted to read the »Nietzschean 
content« in Strindberg’s production. Proponents of this methodology have compared a 
received reading of Nietzschean thought with a reconstruction of Strindberg’s reading 
of the philosopher . In other words, they have read Strindberg’s work in order to deter-
mine its proximity to their own understanding of Nietzsche’s work. I am much more 
interested in a process of valuation that is common to both men. This process utilizes a 
dynamic between distance and proximity. This process has formal characteristics. The 
content, the metaphorical complex that results from this process is considered, but it is 
subordinated to the formal components of the commonality. In other words, I am not 
concerned with the degree of fidelity that Strindberg’s work has to »Nietzschean con-
tent.« I am not concerned with whether »Johan« from Tjänstekvinnans son is an 
Übermensch or whether the »battle of the brains« is a species of der Willie zur Macht. I 
am concerned with the way that both men understand subjectivity as a creative process 
and not as a fact, and I am interested in the commonality of the way they perform this 
creative process. 
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(Strange, through Nietzsche I now find the system for my madness in opposing 
everyone. I re-evaluate and place new values on old things. No one has under-
stood this, not even myself). 15
The question of the relationship between Strindberg and Nietzsche con-
cerns modernity and not the reified notion of individuality; it concerns 
intellectual history and not hero worship and influence. 
 As depicted in the first half of this monograph, Nietzsche’s timeliness 
resides in the question: How can one depict the ephemera of contempo-
rary forms of existence so that the depiction remains as a part of the con-
stituent vocabulary for a yet to be determined future? Late nineteenth-
century thinkers faced this problem with an acute sensitivity for the eva-
nescence of a seemingly ever-changing world while exhibiting an equally 
strong and contradictory desire to create new and lasting ways to describe 
it. Strindberg found that Nietzsche had given him a »system« for his own 
confrontation with becoming, yet he understood modernity to be antago-
nistic to systems and categories. So despite the citation above, he re-
marked paradoxically: »Det är modernt af Nietzsche att ej göra system.« 
(It is modern of Nietzsche to eschew a system.)16 Second-wave modern-
ists tended to designate the times as transitory, as passing away; yet there 
was also a discernable impulse to create something that would survive its 
maker, what Baudelaire called the classic in the modern. Perhaps this is 
what is implied in our paired citations, Nietzsche’s systemless system. 
 The elasticity of the Nietzschean text fits famously with the contradic-
tory elements that confronted a second wave of modern thinkers as they 
sought to explode the straightjacket of reason. Declining either a return 
to the mystical yearnings of Romanticism or German Idealism’s systemic 
enshrinement of rationality, a generation of authors was drawn to the 
flame of Nietzsche’s thought, even if his fame came ironically after his 
own flame had been extinguished. We often learn of the Nietzschean 
contribution to contemporary debates through the extensions of his phi-
losophy, through his legacy. As a result, we have a tendency to accept 
Nietzsche’s claim that he was an untimely philosopher. Placing Nietzsche 
in dialog with Strindberg examines his initial impact in dialogic form, 
thereby illustrating just how timely Nietzsche was for his contemporaries 
and why he remains so for us. 
————
15  STRINDBERG: 1961, letter 1715 to Georg Brandes, Dec. 4, 1888. Translation mine. 
16  Ibid. Letter 1718 to Ola Hansson, Dec. 7, 1888. Translation mine. 
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 The quarrel between the ancients and the moderns seemingly settled 
by Enlightenment parties of progress in favor of those born late is recon-
figured in Nietzsche and Strindberg’s authorships as the anticipated tri-
umph of those born posthumously. Bourgeois self- satisfaction gives way 
to a dynamic anticipation of a future outside of the laws of orderly pro-
gression. A consideration of the two authorships creates a window 
through which one can see the dilemma of the modern subject as he 
struggles to understand how to become who he might be in an environ-
ment devoid of the earthly guarantee of socially stable positions or the 
divine sanction of an interventionist God. Nietzsche and Strindberg both 
conceive of the self as a multiplicity and subjectivity as a negotiation 
between narratives. 
 This issue is not individuality, but the problem of modernity as it per-
tains to subjectivity. The cult of individuality is an ideological affect of the 
moment, not its truth. Nietzsche and Strindberg show us this as they 
concerned themselves with this antinomy of change and duration and 
how this sets the parameters for a process of self-description based on 
contradiction. Their encounter illuminates how the concomitant problem 
of becoming a modern subject is necessarily inflected by a sense of irony. 
Nietzsche’s paradoxical claims that the world is in a state of infinite be-
coming and that one should love his fate thereby becomes a timely de-
scription of his historical moment. Because of this the name Nietzsche 
slips into the discourse of modernity with remarkable facility. 
 Strindberg was self-consciously »modern«. For the quixotic Swede, 
this meant living in anticipation of a future built with the contradictory 
raw material of his psychological and historical moment. Like many oth-
ers of his generation, he regarded modernity as an ever growing complex-
ity without reconciliation. A unified sense of the true or the good or the 
beautiful dissipated within a self-understanding epitomized by a line he 
would write in another letter in May of 1888: »Motsägelserna i mitt förfat-
teri bero på att jag ställt mig eller stått på olika ståndpunkter för att få se 
saken från många sidor! Det är ju rikt och humant.« (The contradictions 
in my authorship result from my changing perspectives, from the desire to 
see things from many sides. This is certainly rich and humane.)17 Strind-
berg had opened his previous letter to Heidenstam by urging his corre-
————
17  Ibid. Letter 1611 to Verner von Heidenstam, written around the 17th of May, 1888.
Translation mine. 
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spondent to »Köp dig en tysk modern filosof som heter Nietsche [sic] om 
hvilken G.B. hållit föreläsningar. Der står allt att läsa! Neka dig ej 
njutningen! N är skald också.« (Buy a German, modern philosopher 
named Nietsche [sic] on whom G.B. has given some lectures. Therein is 
all that there is to read! Do not deny yourself the pleasure! N is also a 
poet.) Strindberg’s self-understanding, his »modernity,« formed itself 
around a constellation of subjective values forged after the loss of an 
Archimedean point. Nietzsche provided him with his systemless system, 
which he believed to have articulated his own restless process of emer-
gent multiplicity in a theoretical form. 
 The epistemology of the encounter is marked by a decided irony, a 
making proximate of the other through identification, and the taking of 
distance in order to judge. In other words the correspondence provides 
us with an actual example of how Nietzsche’s pathos of distance has a 
counter-movement, an assimilation of the other through the modality of a 
polemic. The encounter and its aftermath shed new light upon both 
Nietzsche’s philosophy and Strindberg’s authorship. I would go as far to 
claim that this tale gives us new insight into how the ironic subjectivity of 
late nineteenth century letters anticipates psychoanalytic theory, while 
highlighting the narrative core of this irony, the collision of secular and 
religious discourses. For both men the death of God necessitated the 
narrative substitution of the self for Christ and in this way a study of the 
two authorships illuminates that the modern paradox of creating within 
the parameters of both continuity and renewal necessitates strategies 
based on irony and parody. 
 If as Jürgen Habermas claimed, modernity cannot »borrow the criteria 
by which it takes its orientation from the models supplied by another 
epoch; it has to create its normativity out of itself,«18 then how can this 
self-legitimization function in an age all too eager to create progressive 
narratives of historical development? The salient issue is not a cult of the 
individual, but how the conflation of agonistic narratives is central to the 
genealogical conception of subjectivity shared by Nietzsche and Strind-
berg. The genealogy of self serves as a conceptual apparatus with which 
the irony inherent in modernism’s acute sense of its own contradictions is 
internalized. It is my argument that these contradictions make Nietzsche 
and Strindberg our contemporaries. 
————
18  HABERMAS: 1987, 6.
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Excursus: The Problem of Nietzsche Reception 
This excursus is concerned with developing a methodological alternative 
for analyzing the encounter between Strindberg and Nietzsche. The 
rather thin body of primary source material presents us with a problem 
right from the start. Two questions immediately arise: Knowing that 
Nietzsche’s productive life ended right after his encounter with Strind-
berg, and seeing that the scholarly literature on the subject relies on a 
critical paradigm which provides us with little more than a marginaliza-
tion of the effects of the exchange between the two men, how can we 
proceed? And how can we determine the broader implications of Strind-
berg’s reception of Nietzsche? The general difficulty of Nietzsche recep-
tion is greatly compounded, in our case, by the enormous range of 
Strindberg’s own reading and the great enthusiasm he expressed for a 
wide variety of intellectual figures during the course of his long career. 
Strindberg sang the praises of Darwin, Dickens, Kierkegaard, Rousseau, 
Poe, Schopenhauer and Swedenborg among others. He played the part of 
a pietist, a socialist, an anarchist, an atheist, a scientist, and a religious 
convert at various stages of his life. The diversity of these influences on 
Strindberg and the mercurial aspects of his production demand a new 
approach to the subject of his encounter with Nietzsche.19 It follows that 
the answer to both of our questions is one and the same and is provided 
by a shift in the critical model. We can only fruitfully approach the en-
counter from a methodological perspective that factors in the broader
implications. Therefore, my own approach is informed not by the degree 
of influence exerted, but by the category of commonality. 
 The discussion that follows will address this category, and I will at-
tempt to justify my decision to favor commonality over an influence 
model of reception. It is my contention that an analysis of the encounter 
that utilizes commonality instead of influence has the advantage of being 
more applicable to Nietzsche reception in general and more fruitful in the 
————
19  The breadth of Strindberg’s erudition was great and colored his reception of 
Nietzsche. I am not treating the theoretical problems raised when applying a theory of 
influence to anyone; instead I employ an analysis of the particular case for two reasons: 
1) the employment of the particular case is true to my theoretical claim that matters of 
reception are degraded if generalized, and 2) it is not within the scope of this study to 
make a general claim about Reception Theory; it is my understanding of the particular 
case that drives my methodology; if my findings are suggestive for other cases, it is a 
happy coincidence. 
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particular case of Strindberg. It addresses both the issue of the multiplic-
ity of influences within a reception environment and points to the 
broader implications of an affinity between two thinkers. I will address 
both of these aspects in turn. 
 The name Nietzsche slips into the discourse of literary modernism 
with a remarkable facility. The ease with which Nietzschean motifs can 
be appropriated created a considerable range of reception. For despite the 
differences between those who claim to bear the mark of his influence, 
Nietzsche’s critique of religion, exploration of the boundary between 
conscious thought and unconscious motivation, valorization of style, and 
insistence on philosophy as memoir resonate on the same frequency as 
the works of many of the authors we have come to call ›modernists.‹ 
 Nietzsche’s critique of religion accompanied by a genealogy of morals 
takes issue with the predominance of what he sees as otherworldly 
thought in all aspects of Western culture, and can be connected to a lar-
ger nineteenth century European movement towards a growing seculari-
zation of any claims to truth. His genealogical method itself, which 
attempts to ground unconscious motivation as the origin20 of behavior, 
and sees consciousness as a later development, relegates conscious 
thought to an economy of misrecognitions and fictional representations 
thereby anticipating the psychoanalytic understanding of narrative as the 
means of subject formation. His valorization of style goes hand in hand 
with his claim for the primacy of form over content. Form becomes the 
primary determinant of value, and value is relegated to an opposition 
between vitality and decadence. As a result, the process of self-becoming 
is elevated, and taste displaces morality. Aesthetic considerations win out 
over ethical determinations, and the history of the self loses its grounding 
in a teleological trajectory; the individual thereby gaining freedom and 
facing uncertainty. These aspects of Nietzsche’s project, along with his 
claim for the primacy of a philosopher’s life in the development of his 
thought, splice together aspects of a philosophical autobiography self-
————
20  The use of the word origin with regards to Nietzsche’s thought is always problem-
atic. The problem concisely stated: the impossibility of positing origins is compounded 
in two ways by Nietzche’s use of the term: historically through a metaphor employed 
polemically, and in the construction »self’ by the positing of dual origins. This issue will 
be explored in great detail later in the book. 
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conscious about the relationship of its own creation with the history of 
thought.21
 Nietzsche’s particular understanding of the history of Western 
thought colored his notion of the relationship between autobiography 
and history. His understanding of history was epochal; he believed that 
he was living in a nihilistic age, an age that had witnessed the »death of 
God«. This very event creates a problem for the subject in its moment of 
self-understanding. For how is the subject to understand his own forma-
tion in the absence of a creator? In his answer to this question, Nietzsche 
rejected the possibilities of biological or historical determinism. For 
Nietzsche, any absolute solution to this problem was merely a continua-
tion of what he saw as the nihilistic trajectory of European history. The 
only possibility remaining for Nietzsche, in an attempt to overcome what 
he saw as a historical environment colored by nihilism, was the creation 
of a process of self-generation, a genealogy of self. For Nietzsche the self 
is not given; it must be performed. As his Zarathustra tells us: »dein Leib 
und seine grosse Vernunft: die sagt nicht Ich, aber thut Ich.« (your body 
and its great reason: it does not say I, it performs I.)22
 I use the term genealogy of self to describe this performance, this 
process of subject formation in both Nietzsche and Strindberg’s work. 
The genealogy of self is a hermeneutic device for the construction of the 
subject. It is hermeneutic in that it factors in the optic of the present, sees 
the past as a text to be interpreted, and has a truth claim that is weakened 
by the absence of an absolute and timeless reference point.23 A genealogy
of self is a performative overcoming of origins in the moment. It self-
consciously highlights the fictionality of the past through the conscious 
employment of metaphor, and it emphasizes the struggle between contra-
dictory forces: between notions of heredity and self-creation, between the 
internalized social order and individual experience; in other words the
genealogy of self is the site of the conflation of autobiography and 
history.
————
21  For some interesting observations on the way Strindberg relates history and auto-
biography see ROBINSON, »History and His-Story« collected in STEENE: 1990.
22  NIETZSCHE: KSA 4, 2002, 39. My English translation follows the German. 
23  For a discussion of the weakened truth claim in modern hermeneutics, see VAT-
TIMO: 1997. Vattimo’s thesis relies on his reading of Nietzsche’s »announcement of the 
death of God« as a non-metaphysical event. 
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 The genealogy of self is the Eternal Return of the same as a herme-
neutic circle. It is an attempt to subordinate history to a moment of ritual 
affirmation.24 This affirmation, however, comes without the benefit of a 
divine guarantee. The self, itself, becomes a locus of ritual repetition, but 
there is an irony to this re-enactment. This attempt to subordinate history 
to the construction of an autobiography is necessitated by Nietzsche’s 
understanding of his historical moment as being marked by the »death of 
God« and the subsequent poverty of the history of the self in the absence 
of the guarantee by a divine creator. The irony occurs on three levels that 
are dynamically related. First, historical conditions subject the individual 
to the conditions of a »nihilistic« environment, and he must overcome 
these conditions in order to become a subject. Second, subjectivity is 
constructed through a ritual, which cannot be shared; the ethos of the 
myth becomes pathos by wearing the mask of subjectivity as an affect of 
der Wille zur Macht. Third, the past is internalized, yet is subsumed in an 
agonistic construction that bears the mark of the moment. Competing 
interpretations that posit both necessity and contingency are in an oscil-
lation, which explains the seemingly contradictory Nietzschean notions 
of amor fati and the chaos of the world. This oscillation comes to rest 
temporarily in the construction of the self.25 In this manner, Nietzsche 
attempted to re-enchant the world through a »fabling of being,«26 but he 
was ironically aware of the fictional nature of his own self-construction. 
He named his own »myth« and called it Nietzsche. With a radical gesture 
that both plays off and explodes the bourgeois notion of the individual, 
————
24  See ELIADE: 1991. On page 36, Eliade discusses the myth of the eternal return and 
its use of repetition. He states, »any repetition of an archetypal gesture suspends dura-
tion, abolishes profane time, and participates in mythical time.« While this formulation 
cannot be directly mapped on to the Nietzschean conception of the Eternal Return, it 
informs us on three levels: 1) for Nietzsche, the affirmation of the self is an act of crea-
tion that is archetypal in that it is a repetition of the initial creation of self-
consciousness; 2) the temporality of this action is the moment (see Also sprach 
Zarathusthra); and 3) there is a mythical aspect to this affirmation. 
25  NIETZSCHE: 1988d. See Ecce Homo, »Warum ich ein Schiscksal bin«. Nietzsche 
believed that his understanding of history as the revaluation of all values had a direct 
relationship to his construction of a genealogy of self. The key citation: »Die Ent-
deckung der christlichen Moral ist ein Ereigniss, das nicht seines Gleichen hat, eine 
wirkliche Katastrophe. Wer über sie aufklärt, ist eine force majeure, ein Schicksal, – er 
bricht die Geschichte der Menschheit in zwei Stücke.« The Citation is found in Section 
8, on page 373.
26  Vattimo’s term. 
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the genealogy of self leaves us with an ambiguous legacy and a plethora 
of divergent Nietzsche interpretations. As interpretation is a form of re-
ception, we are also left with another problem: namely, how are we to 
understand his reception? 
In a uniquely intense and immediate manner, Nietzsche touched upon what 
contemporaries regarded as the key experiential dimensions of their individual 
and collective identity. From the beginning, canonizers and condemners alike 
tended to regard him as a critic and maker of a new kind of European moder-
nity characterized by the predicament of nihilism and its transvaluative, liber-
ating and cataclysmic potential.27
In the first chapter of his study of Nietzsche’s reception in Germany, 
Steven E. Aschheim attempts to construct a framework for understanding 
the philosopher’s appeal to a wide variety of groups holding radically 
divergent interests. He points out that Nietzsche’s writings became a 
symbol of renewal for his »appropriators« who »wore selective blind-
ers«28 and came to a variety of often-conflicting readings of his texts. 
Aschheim argues that the key to understanding such a wide range of 
reception lies in an understanding of the context in which the reception 
took place. 
 Aschheim sketches out the broad contours of the context for the ini-
tial Nietzsche reception in the 1890’s in Germany: Nietzsche’s critique of 
»the pieties and conventions of Wilhelmine Germany«29 was »closely 
related to a broader shift in thought and disposition which marked sig-
nificant areas of European life«.30 He sees Nietzsche as an inspiration for 
this broadly based »cultural revolution«31 precisely because of the elastic-
ity of the philosopher’s categories.32 The advantage of this elasticity was 
that Nietzsche’s thought could be appropriated by a variety of ideological 
positions, and it was this aspect that contributed most to his popularity 
————
27  ASCHHEIM: 1994, 10.
28  Ibid., 9.
29  Ibid., 11–12.
30  Ibid., 12. Aschheim sees this shift as »the revolt against positivism and materialism, 
as a generational rebellion against the liberal bourgeoisie, as the era of the discovery of 
the unconscious, and as an age of irrationalism and neo-romanticism.« 
31  Ibid., 13.
32  Ibid., 14. »The Nietzschean impulse becomes a potent protean force precisely 
because it was diffuse and not organized.« 
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with a second wave of modernists who stood in radical opposition to 
what they saw as the failure of the first wave of modernization.33
 As a result, Nietzscheanism was not restricted by or emblematic of 
any one particular ideology. It »functioned by virtue of its implantation 
into other pre-existent structures, it was not constitutive or autono-
mous.«34 Nietzscheanism needed other impulses and already existent 
ideologies, and »acted variously as an inspirational solvent, leavener, 
catalyst, and a gadfly«.35 According to Aschheim, Nietzsche’s writings 
derived their power because he »had dwelled on what was to become a 
central and continuing fin-de-siècle European preoccupation: the percep-
tion of pervasive decadence and degeneration and the accompanying 
search for new sources of physical and mental health.«36 He argues that it 
would be an overstatement to credit Nietzsche as being the sole source of 
this movement for »[t]here are always other forces and influences at 
work. Nevertheless, he was its central inspiration«.37 Aschheim posits a 
Nietzsche who acts as a »prism« through which a rather diverse group of 
social and cultural »revolutionaries« saw their existential condition. Seen 
from this perspective, the problem of tracing a purely Nietzschean influ-
ence and reconstructing an ideal Nietzschean is an exercise in futility. 
 Building from Aschheim’s findings, I contend that the key to under-
standing Nietzsche’s reception is an examination of the discourses al-
ready existent in the environment of the reception. This necessitates an 
exploration of the pre-history of a thinker’s encounter with Nietzsche in 
order to determine how the name Nietzsche functions as a trope in the 
discourse of the reception. Aschheim’s discussion not only points the way 
to a model for our analysis, it also implicitly acts as a warning: any at-
tempt to determine influence by measuring the degree of congruency of 
Nietzsche’s thought to the receiver is misleading. For what does it mean 
————
33  What Aschheim calls the second wave of modernists had a wide variety of concerns 
and perspectives. It is important to make a distinction between modernism, modernists, 
and modernization. Modernism is an aesthetic movement, modernists are the diverse 
group of artists who consider themselves to be modern, and modernization refers to a 
social, economic, and political process. My concerns are with the modernist movement 
in aesthetics and, in particular, Nietzsche and Strindberg as modernists. 
34  Ibid., 15.
35  Ibid. 
36  Ibid., 14.
37  Ibid., 13.
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to be a Nietzschean? What is the possibility of being a disciple of a phi-
losopher who feared the very idea of having followers? For if one is to 
follow Nietzsche and take his suggestion to read his corpus slowly and 
carefully, then the notion of being a pupil of a thinker who believes that a 
good teacher has no pupils is paradoxical at best. When this paradox is 
factored into the equation, an influence model of reception that is based 
on the receiver’s consistent exposition of Nietzschean thought is doomed 
to conclude that the influence was negligible. It is impossible to be a 
Nietzschean and be ›true‹ to Nietzsche. 
 Aschheim’s methodology suggests an alternative to the dead end of 
any attempt to map what amounts to an interpretation of Nietzsche’s 
thought onto another interpretation of the same. My own methodology is 
informed by his findings. I have approached the problem of the encoun-
ter between Nietzsche and Strindberg in two moments. The first section 
of the study explored the discursive environment into which Nietzsche 
was received. The initial point of analysis was Nietzsche’s entry into the 
literary circles of Scandinavia. The aspects of the discourse of the envi-
ronment of the reception were examined. I found that Nietzsche’s entry 
into the discourses of the environment was greatly facilitated by the loss 
of faith in a realist model of depiction and a certain fascination with a 
vitalist, perspectival, and »aristocratic« model predicated upon the con-
cept of personal authenticity. Strindberg and Nietzsche enjoyed a com-
mon status as tropes within this discourse and came to represent the 
paradox of continuity and renewal. 
 Now, I will violate chronology and turn to Strindberg’s reception of 
Nietzsche. It is in this moment that an influence model of reception will 
be eschewed. In its stead, the notion of commonality between the two 
men’s authorial projects will be established. This commonality will be 
established as a specific aspect of both men’s authorial projects. The 
analysis of their intellectual environment was a contextualizing act. There 
was and never is a homogeneous Zeitgeist.
 The reasons for this methodological choice are as follows: the previ-
ous scholarship on the encounter has had the tendency to concentrate its 
energies on the similarities between the content of Nietzsche and Strind-
berg’s thought. Following one influence model or another, the commen-
tators have been content to measure the proximity of Strindberg’s thought 
to their own understanding of Nietzsche’s texts and pass judgment from 
this perspective. In any case, Nietzsche’s influence on Strindberg has 
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been judged to be at best transitory, and at worst negligible. The study of 
Nietzsche’s influence on Strindberg becomes in actuality a statement 
about the impossibility of influence. As a positive model of influence has 
proven to be untenable in this specific instance, the scholarship has here-
tofore relied upon a negative model of influence and has concluded that 
the encounter between the two men was of little importance. 
 The weakness of this approach to the encounter is twofold. If we 
recall, Aschheim’s argument is informed by his observation that there is 
no such thing as a dogmatic Nietzscheanism. His approach to the recep-
tion of the philosopher is based on the understanding that the allure of 
Nietzscheanism resides in how Nietzsche’s work speaks to a variety of 
ideological positions because of its experiential valence. Nietzsche’s sen-
sitivity to the multifaceted aspects of modernism precipitates a reception 
that grafts Nietzscheanism onto an intellectual predisposition colored by 
other influences and, in a dialectical movement, a reception that is indi-
vidualized and never orthodox. The problem of Nietzsche’s reception 
highlights the commonsensical notion that there can be no immaculate 
reception. This explains how Strindberg could so strongly identify himself 
with Nietzsche’s thought while still carrying the influence of others, and 
how the content of his work can be seen as a misreading of the philoso-
pher. In this way, the concentration of the influence model of reception 
on the proximity of the content of Strindberg’s work to a dogmatic 
Nietzscheanism misses the point. There is another, more basic flaw as 
well. It is paradoxical to look for a proximity between the thought of 
these two thinkers and then to judge the degree of Strindberg’s 
Nietzscheanism by the distance between the philosopher’s thought and 
the Swede’s appropriation of it. For the paradox of a Nietzsche reception 
resides in this very appropriation. The Nietzschean gesture itself takes 
distance in order to judge, and appropriates under the aegis of re-
possession and self-creation. It is impossible to judge the degree of a 
receiver’s debt to Nietzsche through an examination of the category of 
content.
The notion of commonality should not be confused with the meta-
physical concept of a Zeitgeist. Its application concentrates upon the 
particular works under analysis and allows for an individual reception 
that factors in the historically informed, experiential valence suggested by 
Aschheim. In our case, the advantage that this approach enjoys over an 
analysis based on a model of influence lies in its fidelity to performative 
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aspects of Strindberg’s reception of Nietzsche. A theory of commonality 
does not attempt to read the particularity of Strindberg’s production un-
der the false universal of a dogmatic Nietzscheanism. Instead it looks for 
points of intersection in the particularity of Strindberg’s work and the 
particularity of the Nietzschean corpus. These points of intersection are 
derived from an analysis of an existing discourse in the historical envi-
ronment of the reception. In this case, I have analyzed the discourse of 
realism and anti-realism in order to understand discrete aspects of status 
of the self as a creative force in the literary life of Scandinavia in 1889.
This has revealed a commonality in both Nietzsche and Strindberg’s 
status as tropes in this discourse. 
 The experiential valence of Strindberg’s reception of Nietzsche can be 
found on the level of form and not content. The salient commonality 
between the two men on this level is their employment of a genealogy of 
self in lieu of a standard autobiography. The Swedish Prometheus,38
August Strindberg identified strongly with Nietzsche and even claimed to 
have anticipated the philosopher. He regarded Nietzsche’s work as a 
philosophical justification of his own position and left us with a fictional 
enactment of what he understood to be the existential possibilities of the 
German’s philosophy. As mentioned, his reading of Nietzsche has disap-
pointed most commentators, who insist that Strindberg either misread the 
philosopher or was hardly influenced by him at all. They point to the 
multitude of influences on Strindberg and relegate his encounter with 
Nietzsche to a passing interlude brought on by Strindberg’s own sense of 
impending personal crisis.39 This is the previously mentioned psycholo-
gism utilized by interpreters of the encounter. Conversely, it is the subject 
and the contention of this study that there is a strong commonality be-
tween the projects of these two men and that Strindberg’s reception 
Nietzsche has the markings of the uncanny experience of seeing oneself 
in another. However, the exploration that follows is not based on biogra-
————
38  The Strindberg monument located in Tegnérlunden (Tegnér grove) in Stockholm 
depicts Strindberg as a rather well-muscled figure, posed as Prometheus, sprawled 
heroically on a rock. I use this term ironically to connote the distance between retro-
spective and contemporary images of the life of an author. 
39  Commentators such as EKLUND: 1948; BORLAND: 1956: and LAMM: 1963 all insist 
that the essential influences on Strindberg’s thought precede his encounter with 
Nietzsche, and that the German philosopher largely served as a source of psychological 
confirmation for Strindberg’s sense of isolation. 
THE ENCOUNTER BETWEEN STRINDBERG AND NIETZSCHE152
phy and does not attempt to sort out the invisible variables in Strindberg 
or Nietzsche’s minds. Instead, our inquiry will be largely intertextual, 
examining the trajectory of both men’s projects, looking for points of 
merger. With this in mind, I turn to the correspondence. 
To Both Be and Not to Be Nietzschean: 
This Is the Possibility40
Der Erste Proselyt, den der erste Kritiker des Nordens machte, war der erste 
Dichter des Nordens. Es gibt auch keinen, dessen Leben eine solche Vorberei-
tung für diese Bekehrung gewesen wäre wie August Strindberg. 
(The first proselyte that the foremost critic of the North converted, was the 
foremost poet of the North. There is also no one else, whose life would have 
been such a preparation for this conversion, besides August Strindberg.)41
Ja, Nietzsche! Men du borde ha märkt att jag för tre år sedan vände i Schleich-
wege och Die Kleinen just i Neue Freie och innan jag hört namnet Nietzsche. 
Derför sade mig Georg B. på Kongens Nytorv strax efter föreläsningen: »Det 
borde vara Er man, Sg, Ni som hatar ›de små.‹« »Visste det,« svarte jag, »och 
ser Ni nu att Sg. hade systemet i sin galenskap.« 
(Yes, Nietzsche! But you ought to have noticed that I had turned three years 
ago with Schleichwege and Die Kleinen in the self same Neue Freie and this 
was before I had heard the name Nietzsche. That is why Georg Brandes said to 
me at Kongens Nytorv right after his lecture: »That would be your man, 
Strindberg, you who hate ›the small.‹« »Right on,« I answered, »and you see 
now that Strindberg had a system to his madness.«)42
The twin epigraphs for this section were taken respectively from Ola 
Hansson’s article on Nietzsche’s influence in Scandinavia and a letter 
from Strindberg written in response to this piece. In the fall of 1889,
Hansson published Nietzscheanismus in Skandinavien in the Neue
Freie Presse, a Viennese daily, which frequently featured the work of 
Scandinavian writers. Strindberg had published a few short stories in the 
very same newspaper and took great pride in his contributions. 
————
40  It is important to keep in mind throughout, that if the premise of the first section of 
this exploration was to illustrate how Nietzsche was in timely correspondence with the 
environment of reception and that Strindberg shared a surface commonality with 
Nietzsche on the level of discourse; then this section will excavate the deep commonal-
ity between the two. However, it is also remarkable how the surface aspects of the 
reception are reproduced in the scholarship. This becomes apparent in the initial reac-
tion to the encounter between Nietzsche and Strindberg.
41  HANSSON: 1889; my translation. 
42  STRINDBERG: 1961, letter 1900 to Ola Hansson, sent around 10/20, 1889.
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 Hansson’s already strong interest in things German and his ambition 
to become a pan-Germanic author were fueled by his contact with 
Strindberg. He had interested the older writer in the work of Edgar Allen 
Poe, but it was Strindberg who had kindled and fanned the flames of 
what was to become Hansson’s burning curiosity about Nietzsche. If 
Brandes acted as a midwife for Strindberg’s encounter with Nietzsche, it 
can be argued that Strindberg played the same role for Hansson’s en-
counter with the philosopher’s works and his subsequent role as the first 
Scandinavian to inform the German-speaking world about Nietzsche’s 
reception in the North. Ironically enough, Hansson beat Brandes to the 
German-speaking world by publishing on Nietzsche first. If Nietzsche 
was exposed to the Scandinavian intellectual world through the work of 
the Dane, Brandes, he was brought back to Germany through these two 
Swedes.
 Hansson and Georg Brandes were Strindberg’s main correspondents 
about the subject of Friedrich Nietzsche. In fact, Brandes had not only 
introduced Strindberg to Nietzsche’s thought, but had arranged both 
their exchange of books and their correspondence. And so two questions 
arise: why would Hansson consider Strindberg to be the first acolyte that 
Brandes had won for Nietzsche (despite the Dane’s own silence on the 
issue), and why would Strindberg protest against this label? These ques-
tions have been a problem conflated by the scholarship to date and 
deemed to be a matter of influence and the resistance to it. It is my belief 
that these questions lead us to an investigation of something much more 
intrinsic to Nietzsche and Strindberg’s authorial projects: namely, the 
construction and re-construction of the narrative of self. It follows that 
the answer to our questions lies in the tension between public and private 
statements. What follows is the story of these utterances. 
 In the spring of 1888, Brandes was in the midst of giving a series of 
lectures on what he called Nietzsche's »Aristocratic Radicalism« when he 
met Strindberg on Kongens Nytorv in Copenhagen. According to the 
October 20th, 1889 letter from Strindberg to Ola Hansson and a letter from 
Strindberg to Brandes on the 22nd of April 1890, Brandes is reported to 
have said: »Det maa være Deres Mand Strindberg, De som hader de 
smaa.« (That may be your man Strindberg, you who hate the small.)43
Brandes not only introduced Strindberg to Nietzsche's work, he also 
————
43  My translation.  
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wrote to Nietzsche about Strindberg. He first mentions Strindberg to the 
German in a letter from April 3, 1888: »Wenn Sie Schwedisch lesen, ma-
che ich Sie auf das einzige Genie Schwedens, August Strindberg, auf-
merksam … Wenn Sie über die Frauen schreiben, sind sie sehr ähnlich.« 
(If you read Swedish, I would like to present and make you aware of 
Sweden’s only genius, August Strindberg. When you write about women, 
you are very similar.)44
 Strindberg claimed to have sent Nietzsche a copy of Fadren (The
Father) in a French translation in April of the same year.45 Nietzsche 
never got the package, but received another copy of the tragedy in No-
vember. On October 2, Strindberg wrote Brandes thanking him for 
Nietzsche’s book Der Fall Wagner (The Case of Wagner) and calling the 
philosopher »den mest frigjorda, den modernaste af oss alla (naturligtvis 
icke minst i qvinno-frågan)« (the most liberated, the most modern of us 
all (naturally not least of all regarding the women’s question)).46 Brandes 
relayed the Swede’s enthusiasm to Nietzsche. In a letter written just four 
days later, he remarked: »Ich habe ein Exemplar des Buches an den 
grössten schwedische Schriftsteller August Strindberg gegeben, den ich 
ganz für Sie gewonnen haben. Er ist ein wahres Genie, nur ein bisschen 
verrückt wie die meisten Genies (und Nicht-Genies).« (I have sent a copy 
of the book to the greatest Swedish author, August Strindberg, whom I 
have won over for you. He is a true genius, although a bit crazy like most 
geniuses (and non-geniuses).)47 Nietzsche became quite excited over the 
news that he had won a »true genius« as a new reader. He wrote 
Heinrich Köselitz just eight days later, and in a statement that closely 
paraphrased Brandes, told his friend the news.48 On October 20, he asked 
————
44  Georg Brandes to Friedrich Nietzsche. Letter collected in NIETZSCHE: 1984b, 185–
186. The English is my translation. 
45  STRINDBERG: 1961, 127. Letter 1715 to Georg Brandes dated November 29, 1888:
»Nietsche [sic] sände jag Fadren för 8 månader sedan till hans förläggares adress. Nu 
går en till.« My translation. »I sent Nietzsche The Father eight months ago to his pub-
lisher’s address. Now here goes another.«
46  STRINDBERG: 1961, 127. Letter 1647 to Georg Brandes dated October 2, 1888.
47  Georg Brandes: Letter to Friedrich Nietzsche dated October 6, 1888. Collected in 
NIETZSCHE: 1984b, 320. Translation mine. 
48  NIETZSCHE: 1984a, 450. Letter to Heinrich Köselitz dated October 14, 1888: »Er 
[Brandes] hat ein Exemplar meiner Schrift an den größten schwedische Schriftsteller, 
der ganz für mich gewonnen sei, August Strindberg, gegeben, er nennt ihn ein ›wahres 
Genie‹, nur etwas verrückt.« Nietzsche repeated the same message in a November 13
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Brandes for Strindberg’s address so that he could send him a copy of 
Götzendämmerung.49 By mid November, Nietzsche had received a copy 
of Strindberg’s Giftas (Les mariés), apparently from Brandes. 50 The 
Dane wrote Nietzsche on November 16, stressing the similarity between 
the two men’s misogynist views, quoting Strindberg on his identification 
with Nietzsche, and urging Nietzsche to read Strindberg’s aforemen-
tioned tragedy, Fadren (The Father).51 Nietzsche read both the tragedy 
and the marriage novellas in French translation and was moved to re-
mark to Köselitz: 
Diese Tage machte ich die gleiche Reflexion bei einem wahrhaft genialen Werk 
eines Schweden, des mir von Dr. Brandes als Hauptverehrer vorgestellten Au-
gust Strindberg. Es ist die französische Cultur auf einem unvergleichlich stär-
keren und gesünderen fond: der Effeckt ist bezaubernd: Les mariés heißt es, 
Paris 1885 – sehr curios, wir stimmen über das »Weib« absolut überein – es war 
bereits Dr. Brandes aufgefallen. 
(These days I have had the same reflection on a truly ingenious work by a 
Swede, August Strindberg, who was introduced to me as a great admirer by Dr. 
Brandes. It is French culture from an incomparably stronger and healthier 
source: the effect is enchanting: it’s called Getting Married, Paris 1885 – very 
curious, we agree on »woman« absolutely – Dr. Brandes already noticed 
this.)52
Nietzsche’s admiration and identification with Strindberg continued in a 
letter to Brandes shortly thereafter where Nietzsche remarked: »Meine 
aufrichtige Bewunderung, der nichts Eintrag thut, als das Gefühl, mich 
dabei ein wenig mitzubewundern.« (My most unreserved admiration, 
————
letter to Köselitz. The difference, the past participle gewonnen is replaced by einge-
nommen.
49  Ibid., 456–457. Friedrich Nietzsche, letter to Georg Brandes, dated October 20, 1888:
»… (– der Titel ist jetzt: Götzendämmerung. Oder: Wie man mit dem Hammer philo-
sophirt) möchte ich sehr gern auch dem von Ihnen mit so ehrenden Worten vorgestell-
ten Schweden ein Exemplar senden. Nur weiß ich seinen Wohnort nicht. – Diese Schrift 
ist meine Philosophie in nuce – radikal bis zum Verbrechen …« 
50 Married or Getting Married, depending on which English translation you pick up. 
51  NIETZSCHE: 1984b, 353. Georg Brandes, letter to Friedrich Nietzsche dated Novem-
ber 16, 1888: »Der tolle Schwede heisst August Strindberg; er wohnt hier. Seine Adresse 
ist Holte bei Kopenhagen. Er liebt Sie besonders, weil er meint seinen Frauenhass bei 
Ihnen zu finden … Als er in den Zeitungen die Referate über meine Frühlingsvorlesun-
gen las, sagte er: es ist erstaunlich mit diesem Nietzsche, vieles bei ihm ist, als ob ich es 
geschrieben hätte. In französicher Sprache ist sein Drama Père mit einem Vorwort von 
Zola erschienen.« 
52  NIETZSCHE: 1984a, 479: Letter to Heinrich Köselitz dated November 16, 1888. Trans-
lation mine. 
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which is marred only by the feeling that in admiring him I also admire 
myself a little.)53 So, on the surface, Brandes had arranged a mutual admi-
ration society with two members who were united by their views on 
women. However, Nietzsche’s remark above displays the ironic distance 
that he kept from the encounter. He simultaneously distanced himself 
through irony from his admiration for Strindberg and brought his own 
valuation closer to himself. For as he admires the Swede; he admires 
himself.
 This activity, at once a distancing and a making proximate, is intrinsic 
to the Nietzschean notion of der Wille zur Macht (the will to power) as
an interpretive agency and the ascription of values made possible by das 
Pathos der Distanz (the Pathos of Distance).54 »Aus diesem Pathos der 
Distanz heraus haben sie sich das Recht, Werthe zu schaffen, Namen der 
Werthe auszuprägen, erst genommen.« (It is out of this pathos of dis-
tance that they first seized the right to create values and coin names for 
values.)55 For Nietzsche, the noble perspective allows a distance to phe-
nomena. This distance enables a valuation of these phenomena and this 
valuation coincides with naming. Naming, in turn, is a means of taking 
possession:
Das Herrenrecht, Namen zu geben, geht so weit, dass man sich erlauben sollte, 
den Ursprung der Sprache selbst als Machtäusserung der Herrschenden zu fas-
sen: sie sagen »das ist das und das,« sie siegeln jegliches Ding und Geschehen 
mit einem Laute ab und nehmen es dadurch gleichsam in Besitz. 
(The lordly right of giving names extends so far that one should allow oneself 
to conceive the origin of language itself as an expression of power on the part 
of the rulers: they say »this is this and this,« they seal every thing and event 
with a sound and, as it were, take possession of it.)56
————
53  Ibid.: Letter to Georg Brandes dated November 20, 1888. Translation in MIDDLE-
TON: 1996, 327.
54  There are numerous references in the Nachlass for Nietzsche’s definition of der 
Wille zur Macht as an interpretive agent and as a pathos. As for das Pathos der Dis-
tanz, the best examples are found in aphorism 257 of Jenseits von Gute und Böse and
Essay 1, section 2 of Zur Genealogie der Moral. The relationship between these 
Nietzschean tropes and the creation of subjectivity will be developed at much greater 
length in a later chapter. 
55  NIETZSCHE: 1993, 259. English translation in KAUFMANN and HOLLINGDALE: 1967,
26.
56  Ibid., 260.The English translation is found in KAUFMANN and HOLLINGDALE: 1967,
26.
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Possession brings the phenomena closer to oneself. The pathos of dis-
tance that interprets phenomena from a noble perspective, also engages 
other perspectives. This engagement is intrinsic to the Nietzschean gene-
alogy and takes the form of a polemic (eine Streitschrift). In the Vorrede
to Zur Genealogie der Moral (On the Genealogy of Morals), Nietzsche 
claims that a polemic is an »Auseinandersetzung« that makes former 
influences, in that case Schopenhauer, contemporary.57 Polemic, then, is 
a pathos of engagement, a means of making another perspective proxi-
mate. The oscillation between a pathos of interpretation, which expands 
the self towards another perspective, and a pathos of distance, which 
facilitates the organization of interpretations into a system of values, is 
essential for the Nietzschean notion of the necessary fiction of self-hood. 
For if his genealogy of morals constructed a »history« of the creation of 
societal consciousness through an internalization process, then we must 
remember that Nietzsche had previously posited: »unser Leib ist ja nur 
ein Gesellschaftsbau vieler Seelen.« (for our body is only a social struc-
ture composed of many souls.)58 This internalization process is put under 
the microscope in Ecce Homo by means of a genealogy of self. The 
Nietzschean process of the creation of self-hood, the ascription of value 
to the fictional doer in light of the deed, will be revisited in the next chap-
ter of this study. As for now, suffice it to say that the dynamic of distance 
and proximity is common to both Nietzsche’s genealogical method and 
his processing of Strindberg as an external phenomenon. This dynamic 
would have its echoes in Strindberg’s own formulation of the problem of 
Nietzsche’s influence: the ambiguity of identification and distancing that 
the commentary has up to now taken as a psychological aspect of the 
anxiety of influence rather than an epistemological problem. 
 In the late fall, Strindberg and Nietzsche entered into a short-lived 
correspondence. The first letter came from Nietzsche to Strindberg on 
November 27, 1888. The correspondence lasted only until Nietzsche's 
nervous collapse shortly after the New Year. During this period of corre-
spondence the two men exchanged some books. As mentioned, Strind-
berg sent Nietzsche Giftas (Getting Married) and Fadren (The Father) in 
November. At the end of the fall, Nietzsche sent Strindberg Der Fall 
————
57  NIETZSCHE: 1993, 252
58  NIETZSCHE: 1993, 33. The English translation is in HOLLINGDALE: 1990, 49. The 
citation comes from Jenseits von Gut und Böse, Aphorism 19.
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Wagner (The Case of Wagner) and Götzendämmerung (Twilight of the 
Idols), and in the middle of December, Zur Genealogie der Moral (On
the Genealogy of Morals). Strindberg sent Nietzsche the novella, Sam-
vetsqval (Pangs of Conscience) and shortly thereafter he borrowed 
Nietzsche's Menschliches, Allzumenschliches (Human, All Too Hu-
man) from Ola Hansson, probably in January of 1889.59 The tone of the 
correspondence escalated from an air of mutual admiration, to an attempt 
by Nietzsche to use Strindberg to forward his plans to have his works 
translated, to a dizzying and cryptic exchange of letters at its terminus. 
 Throughout the period of the correspondence with Nietzsche, 
Brandes kept in touch with Strindberg through the mail. On the subject 
of the German philosopher, he responded to the Swedish writer’s exu-
berance with moderation. Brandes’ attitude towards Nietzsche’s work 
was measured by sober experience. His reply to Strindberg’s intoxicated 
declaration that Nietzsche was a liberator who heralded the decline of 
the West reads as paternal advice: »Meget hos ham synes mig mindre nyt 
end det forekommer Dem og ham selv. Hans Antikristendom kan jo ikke 
– det vil De vist indrømme mig – gjøre et særdeles dybt Indtryk paa den, 
der i 20 Aar og mere har baaret – i lang Tid ene – Odiet af at være 
Nordens Antikrist.« (Much in him seems less new to me than it does to 
both you and himself. His anti-Christianity can certainly not – that you 
must allow me – make an especially deep impression on the one – who 
for 20 years and more has borne – for a long time alone – the odium of 
being the Anti-Christ of the North.)60
 Brandes continued his evenhanded approach to Nietzsche in both his 
public communication and his private correspondence to Strindberg. 
Strindberg began to respond more moderately to Brandes, even question-
ing the philosopher’s sanity at one point. It is here that an interesting 
twist to this story takes shape. Strindberg’s final letter about Nietzsche to 
Brandes was written the 22nd of April 1890. The letter came in response to 
an April 20th letter from the Danish critic where he issued a stern warning: 
»De maa endelig ikke fordybe Dem saaledes i Nietzsche. Der er Element i 
————
59  Strindberg also may have read Also Sprach Zarathustra, mentioned in letters to 
Hansson and he later read Der Willie Zur Macht (The Will to Power), that infamous 
collection of notebook entries edited by Nietzsche’s sister Elizabeth. Strindberg men-
tions this work in his Blue Book and an essay, »Religious Renaissance.« 
60  Georg Brandes, letter to August Strindberg dated December 5, 1888. My translation. 
Letter collected in BRANDES, E., and G. BRANDES: 1952–1956, 295.
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ham, som er at bruge, et andet, som leder Følelsen og Tanken vild. De er 
som Poet ikke mistroisk nok overfor Idègang.« (At the end of the day, 
you ought not to engross yourself so in Nietzsche. There is an aspect of 
him to use, and another, which can lead your feelings and thoughts 
astray. You, as you are a poet, are not wary enough over the course of 
your ideas.)61 In the same letter, Brandes described his misgivings about 
the political implications of Nietzsche’s disgust for the French Revolu-
tion, urging Strindberg to »anvende Deres kritiske Hoveds Kritik« (use 
your critical sense.)62 Strindberg responded two days later. The April 22nd
letter to Brandes opened with an explanation of how Strindberg had 
anticipated Nietzsche and how the philosopher’s program coincided with 
his own. He continued by explaining that Brandes himself had recog-
nized this congruency and then launched into a tirade about his persecu-
tion at the hands of »små tyranner till partivänner som vill sätta mig på 
dårhus derför – jag hade rätt i qvinnofråga etc.« (an alliance of minor 
tyrants who want to put me in the insane asylum because I was right 
about the women’s question, etc.).63 Then Strindberg bared the device. 
The entire Nietzsche problem, he explained, is to be staged in the form of 
a novel.64 It seems that Strindberg could not decide what was philosophi-
cally true until he worked it out in a fictional world. The question was 
not to be or not to be Nietzschean, but rather what might be possible in a 
confrontation of the inner life of the self in constant formation and ref-
ormation with an internalized intellectual force. Consequently, Strind-
berg’s response to Brandes’ warning was to reassure him that the problem 
would be enacted as a possibility. The conflation of an external intellec-
tual force with Strindberg’s own internal imperatives is projected onto the 
scene of writing, the locus of naming. Strindberg, in this moment, saw his 
public expression as being a result of the struggle between a proximity to 
Nietzsche and a desire to distance himself through a staging of this very 
struggle. He would take possession of Nietzsche’s thought by giving it his 
————
61  Ibid., 300. Georg Brandes, Letter to August Strindberg dated April 20, 1890. My 
translation.
62  Ibid. My translation.  
63  Ibid., 301. August Strindberg: Letter to Georg Brandes dated April 22, 1890. My 
translation.
64  Ibid. »Hela problemet håller jag nu på att sätta i scen i en stor roman till hösten (I
havsbandet).« (I am in the midst of staging the entire problem in a great novel to come 
out in the fall (By the Open Sea).) My translation.
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own name. This dynamic explains his paraphrasing of Brandes back to 
the Dane in the same letter: »Man skall gå igenom (befruktas av) N. och 
sedan rensa sig ifrån honom.« (One should go through (be fertilized by) 
N. and then purge oneself of him.)65 Like Brandes, Strindberg was much 
more interested in dissemination than insemination. 
 This paraphrase leaves us with a riddle to solve. For if Strindberg truly 
felt that his program coincided with Nietzsche’s, that he had anticipated 
him, that Nietzsche’s writings were so close to his own that he experi-
enced the sensation that the philosopher had written his own thoughts, 
how could he purge himself of his »influence«? Perhaps Brandes’ warn-
ing about the two sides of Nietzsche, one to be used and the other to 
eschew, alerts us to an answer to our question. This answer informs us of 
the location where Strindberg’s project coincided with Nietzsche’s phi-
losophy; it resides in the role that the past plays in the construction of a 
narrative of self, through the dynamic between interpretive distance and 
proximity of engagement; it also resides in philosophy as a fictional pos-
sibility with interstices in which the self is reconciled with its history. 
 If Brandes’ warning and Strindberg’s response alerts us to how 
Strindberg’s seemingly paradoxical proximity and distance to Nietzsche’s 
thought reveals the epistemological commonality in their respective au-
thorial projects, Strindberg’s correspondence with others about Nietzsche 
informs us about another dynamic which problematizes the work of the 
scholarship. Here the salient issue is the relationship that Strindberg 
perceives himself to have with his own past. With this in mind, we return 
to our original questions: why did Ola Hansson perceive Strindberg as 
the first acolyte won by Brandes for Nietzsche in the North and why did 
Strindberg protest this labeling? 
 Strindberg had enthusiastically spread the word about the philoso-
pher in his voluminous correspondence with his many literary friends. He 
began to be associated with Nietzsche as a result of his own enthusiasm. 
Shortly after his meeting with Brandes, Strindberg read Nietzsche’s Jen-
seits von Gut und Böse (Beyond Good and Evil). His first reference to 
Nietzsche came in a letter to Verner von Heidenstam dated May 17, 1888:
»Köp dig en tysk modern filosof som heter Nietsche [sic] om hvilken 
G.B. hållit föreläsningar. Der står allt att läsa! Neka dig ej njutningen! N 
är skald också.« (Buy a German, modern philosopher named Nietsche 
————
65  Ibid. My translation. 
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[sic] on whom G.B. has given some lectures. Therein is all that there is to 
read! Do not deny yourself the pleasure! N is also a poet.)66 Praise of and 
enthusiasm over Nietzsche’s books became a common theme in Strind-
berg’s letters through 1890. As Strindberg wrote to Nietzsche himself at 
the beginning of December 1888: »Je termine touts mes lettres à mes amis: 
lisez Nietzsche: C’est mon Carthago est delenda!« (I end all my letters to 
my friends: read Nietzsche: This is my Carthage must be destroyed!)67
 Strindberg expressed his enthusiasm for the philosopher in numerous 
ways. He received Nietzsche as a fertilizing agent: »Emellertid mitt aands-
liv har i sitt uterus mottagit en förfärlig sädesuttömning af Friedrich 
Nietzsche, så att jag känner mig full som en hynda i buken.« (Meanwhile, 
my spiritual life has taken in a terrible emptying of Friedrich Nietzsche’s 
seed, so that I feel filled like a bitch in the belly.)68 Then, consequently, 
Nietzsche was a source of inspiration already enshrined in the literary 
pantheon: »Skrifver samtidigt en modern roman i Nietzsche och Poes 
fotspår.« (At the same time, I am writing a modern novel which follows 
in Nietzsche and Poe’s footsteps.)69 As such, the philosopher intoxicated 
Strindberg, and strengthened his conviction, but he threatened his sanity:  
Jag tror Nietzsche gör mig blind, emedan min hjerna är som ett sår! Af 
öfveransträngning! Men han gör mig visst tokig också! Ty hans oerhörda 
sjelfkänsla i sina böcker ha[r] gifvit mig en dylik. Hvilket hindrar icke att min 
gråa hjernbark kan brista, som den nog gör … 
(I believe that Nietzsche is making me blind, because my brain is like a sore! 
From over exertion! And he also is making me crazy! For the unprecedented 
self-esteem in his books has given me the same. This will not keep my gray 
brain bark from bursting, which it certainly will …) 70
Nietzsche strengthened Strindberg because his work served as a unifying 
force, an explanation for Strindberg’s own production: his systemless 
————
66  STRINDBERG: 1961, 91, letter 1611. My translation. 
67  NIETZSCHE: 1984b, 376, letter 621. Letter from August Strindberg to Friedrich 
Nietzsche dated the beginning of December, 1888. Translation from the French is mine. 
68  STRINDBERG: 1961, 112. August Strindberg: letter to Edvard Brandes, Danish play-
wright and politician and Georg’s brother dated September 4, 1888. Letter 1632. Transla-
tion to English by Stefanie von Schnurbein.
69  STRINDBERG: 1938, 57. Letter from August Strindberg to Ola Hansson dated July 6,
1889. My translation. 
70  STRINDBERG: 1961, 236. August Strindberg: letter 1761 to Ola Hansson dated January 
28, 1889.
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system.71 He threatened Strindberg’s sanity because the surety with which 
Nietzsche expressed himself, this source of confirmation for Strindberg, 
also threatened the Swede; the self-confidence that springs from a feeling 
of certainty, the sensation of isolation that comes when one thinks one-
self a prophet without a God with whom he could communicate. This 
isolation was in both men’s minds (and this is what was hypostatized by 
Hansson in his Nietzsche essay) a result of their understanding of nihil-
ism and of what they considered to be historically derived decadence. As 
Strindberg wrote to Georg Brandes at the close of 1888:
För mig står Nietzsche som bebådaren af Europas och kristendomens 
undergång. Orientens vaknande och återinträdande i sina rättigheter så som 
adeln hvilken de äldsta anorna. Kristendom är mig nemlig ett barbari … ett 
bakslag i utvecklingen, de smås, de uslas, kastraternas, qvinnornas, barnens 
och vildernas religion, derföre är de i rak strid med vår evolution som vill 
skydda den starke mot den dåliga arten … Nietzsche är mig derföre den 
moderne anden som vågar predika den starkes, den klokes rätt gentemot de 
dumma, de små (demokraterna), och jag kan tänka den stora andens lidande 
under de många smås våld … och jag helsar i honom befriaren och slutar 
såsom hans katekumen mina bref till literära vänner så: läs Nietzsche. 
(For me, Nietzsche stands as the herald of the decline of Europe and Christian-
ity. The Orient’s awakening and return to its rights as the nobles with the old-
est lineage. I regard Christianity as barbarism … a regression in development, 
the religion of the small, the wretched, the eunuchs, the women, the children, 
and the savages; therefore it is in direct conflict with our evolution which 
wants to protect the strong against inferior types … As a result, Nietzsche is, 
for me, the modern spirit who dares to preach the strong, the intelligent’s right 
over the dumb, the small (the democrats), and I can also imagine the great 
spirit’s suffering from the violence of the small … and I greet Nietzsche as a 
liberator, and end my letters to my literary friends with what passes as his cate-
chism: read Nietzsche.)72
Strindberg’s description of Nietzsche’s mission as the herald of the de-
cline of the West carries the resonance of an overheated sermon. It also 
sets up an opposition between the great man who sees the coming of the 
end of life as he knows it, and those who enjoy the fruits of this decline 
————
71  STRINDBERG: 1961, 192. August Strindberg: letter 1715 to Georg Brandes dated 
December 4, 1888. »Eget att jag genom Nietzsche finner systemet i min galenskap att 
›opponerar mot allt.’ Jag omtaxerar och sätter nya värden på gamla saker! Det har man 
ej förstått. Knappt jag sjelf.« My translation: »Strange that I find through Nietzsche the 
system in my madness in opposing myself against everything. I re-evaluate and place 
new values on old things. No one has understood this. I barely understand it myself.« 
72  STRINDBERG: 1961, 192. August Strindberg: letter 1715 to Georg Brandes dated De-
cember 4, 1888.
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and persecute the man of vision. If Nietzsche represented this man for 
Strindberg, it was because he identified himself with this position as well. 
For in 1888, Strindberg was living in exile, isolated from his countrymen, 
in desperate straits, and, perhaps, most importantly for this discussion, 
disillusioned with his own past. His socialist political agenda was now a 
source of discomfort. He had become the bête noire of Swedish letters: 
viewed as a reactionary by the left and as an immoralist by the right. In a 
May 25th letter to Heidenstam, Strindberg described his understanding of 
his own authorship as such: 
Mitt författeri: ett sökande efter sanningen! Idiotisk i sjelf kanske, ty sanningen 
är endast konventionell. Man öfverenskommer massvis att detta skall vara 
sant, och så det andra lögn! … Motsägelserna i mitt författeri bero på att jag 
ställt mig eller stått på olika ståndpunkter för att få se saken från många sidor! 
Det är ju rikt och humant … 
P.S. Om jag skulle med ord ange min ståndpunkt nu blefve det så: Ateist. 
Kristus-hatare. Anarkist-optimat (Frihet för alla, äfven de kloka och starka att 
göra sig, hvarigenom och om icke de små vore privilegierade verlden skulle 
regeras af kloka och starka, hvilka skulle öka lusten). 
 (My authorship: a seeking after truth! Idiotic in itself, maybe, for truth is only 
convention. One comes into agreement en masse that that should be true and 
the other should be a lie! … The contradictions in my authorship occur be-
cause I have placed myself or stood for different perspectives in order to see 
things from many sides! That is certainly rich and humane … 
P.S. If I should specify my perspective in words, it now becomes: Atheist. 
Christ-hater. Optimal-anarchist. (Freedom of all, including the wise and the 
strong to make out, whereas if the small were not privileged, the world would 
be ruled by the wise and the strong who would increase the pleasure).)73
So much for the apparent »distancing« that Strindberg supposedly took 
from his encounter with Nietzsche. As for the commonality with 
Nietzsche: a fragmented letter with an unknown addressee and collected 
in Nietzsche’s Briefwechsel leaves us with an interesting parallel: 
… ich komme aus hundert Abgründen, in die noch kein Blick sich gewagt, ich 
kenne Höhen, wohin kein Vogel sich verflog, ich habe am Eis gelebt, – ich bin 
verbrannt worden von hundert Schneen: es scheint mir, daß warm und kalt in 
meinem Munde andere Begriffe sind 1. Ruhm und Ewigkeit 2. Letzter Wille 3.
Zwischen Raubvögeln 4. Das Feuerzeichen 5. Die Sonne sinkt 6. Von der Ar-
mut des Reichsten. 
(I come out of a hundred abysses, in which yet no one dares to gaze. I know 
the heights where no bird has flown. I have lived on ice and have become 
burnt from a hundred snows. It seems to me that other concepts are warm and 
————
73  STRINDBERG: 1961, 92. Letter 1612 to Verner von Heidenstam dated May 25, 1888.
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cold in my mouth. They are 1.Fame and Eternity 2. Last will 3. Between Birds 
of Prey 4. The Fire Sign 5. The Sun Sinks 6. From the Poverty of the Richest 74
The numbered items in this fragment list Dionysian Dithyrambs. 
Nietzsche’s poetry is connected to his vision, his shaping of oppositions, 
of heights and abysses into literary form. Strindberg for his part had 
turned his back on his search for truth. His pietism and his socialism 
were now seen as experimental positions. The truth of his authorship was 
its lack of truth and its abundance of perspectives. He reasoned that if 
truth is merely convention accepted by the masses, then the truth of the 
individual resides in the fluidity of his interpretation of his own past. This 
explains the paradox of his twin declarations: that Nietzsche had given 
him a system for his madness and that it was modern of Nietzsche not to 
have a system.75 The system that Strindberg was referring to in the first 
statement was no system at all; it was a process. I call this systemless 
system the genealogy of self. This is the key to understanding how 
Strindberg understands his own Nietzsche reception. He understood the 
philosopher’s work as a theoretical explanation of his own quixotic au-
thorship. This insight was not based on a reconciliation of contradictory 
elements under the umbrella of a system; rather it was the recognition of 
a mode of evaluation that was based on a series of narratives that empha-
sized a dynamic act of creation based on the internalization of seemingly 
antagonistic principles. Strindberg’s truth claim was contingent upon a 
process of value laden description that bared its own device: the oscilla-
tion between a pathos of distance (genealogy) and a pathos of engage-
ment (naming in a polemical mode). Despite the claims of the anti-
realists: authenticity was never in the picture. 
 The correspondence reaffirms Strindberg’s contradictory reception of 
Nietzsche; he saw both the articulation of a system that described his 
own authorship in philosophical terms and simultaneously denied that 
Nietzsche had constructed a system. The system for Strindberg’s madness
was the reconciliation of his past through the acceptance of multiple 
————
74  NIETZSCHE: 2003, 495, letter 1162. Translation mine.  
75  See my footnote 71, letter to Georg Brandes dated December 4, 1888: »Eget att jag 
genom Nietzsche finner systemet i min galenskap …« My translation. »Strange that I 
find a system for my madness through Nietzsche.« see also Strindberg’s letter to Ola 
Hansson dated December 7, 1888: »Det är modernt af Nietzsche att ej göra system.« My 
translation. »It is modern of Nietzsche to not construct a system.« This letter is collected 
in STRINDBERG: 1961, 196, letter 1718.
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perspectives organized by the imperatives of his moment, his Augenblick.
The past is seen as a series of roles played out, an experiment with differ-
ent perspectives enacted through an authorship. This sheds light on 
Strindberg’s remark to Georg Brandes about his reception of Nietzsche: 
»När såg jag i Nietzsche, den jag delvis anticiperat, fann hela rörelse 
formulerad, tog jag in hans ståndpunkt, och ämnar nu allt framgent 
experimentera med den ståndpunkt för att se hvart den leder.« (When I 
saw in Nietzsche that which I partially anticipated, the entire movement 
became formulated. I took in his perspective and intend henceforth to 
experiment with this perspective to see where it leads.)76 Strindberg’s 
understanding of his reception of Nietzsche was that it was an experi-
mental enactment, a fictional performance of the possibilities of the Ger-
man’s philosophy and of his own possibilities previously present in the 
shadows of his experience, as yet to be articulated by the light of the 
noonday sun. This performance was not delimited by the influence of 
Nietzsche’s thought. Rather, Nietzsche’s thought, an external influence, 
was conflated in the present tense with a personal understanding of the 
history of the self. 
 Despite the dizzy intoxication of the letters to Hansson and von Hei-
denstam, it was no accident that he would express the experimental na-
ture of his enactment to Georg Brandes. As mentioned previously, 
Brandes’ own position on Nietzsche was rather sober. He felt a responsi-
bility for that which he brought into the world. For Brandes had not only 
delivered the first public lectures on the works of Friedrich Nietzsche, he 
had arranged the contact between the two men. Strindberg, in turn, had 
loaned Ola Hansson Jenseits von Gut und Böse in December of 1888.
Hansson had previously read Zur Genealogie der Moral, but Strindberg 
fueled his enthusiasm for its author.77 Unlike Brandes, Hansson was un-
————
76  My translation of a letter from Strindberg to Georg Brandes dated April 12, 1890.
Collected in BRANDES, E., and G. BRANDES: 1952–1956, 298.
77  STRINDBERG: 1938, 10. Letter from Ola Hansson to August Strindberg dated 
December 5, 1888: »Jenseits von Gut und Böse håller jag på med. Jag har förut läst ett 
arbete af Nietzsche: Zur Genealogie der Moral. Jag har alldeles samma förnimmelse nu 
som då: det är som om jag satt i en karusell. Allting går runt för mig. Men jag antar, att 
den mannen skall läsas mer än en gång och grundligt. Jag saknar den Arkimediska 
punkten, en stabil sockel af fakta. Det hela är mig en fantastisk hängande trädgård. Vill 
du, när jag nu sänder dessa böckerna tillbaka, låna mig en ny laddning av samma sort.« 
(I am now reading Beyond Good and Evil. I had previously read a work of Nietzsche’s: 
On the Genealogy of Morals. I have the exact same sensation now as then: it is as if I 
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der the influence of Strindberg’s experimentation. While the older, more 
temperate Brandes had warned Strindberg about Nietzsche’s excesses, 
the younger Hansson had engaged with Strindberg in an intoxicated 
series of discussions and letters about the philosopher. Strindberg, always 
an actor aware of his interlocutor’s predilections, responded to Brandes’ 
paternal warning with caution and answered Hansson’s inebriated exu-
berance in kind. As a result, when Hansson wrote his article on 
Nietzsche’s growing influence in Scandinavia, he depicted Strindberg as 
the first acolyte whom Brandes had won for the German. As discussed 
previously, Strindberg reacted vehemently in a letter dated just five days 
after Hansson’s article came out, his response chiding its author. Strind-
berg’s reminder to Hansson carried the intimation that he had anticipated 
Nietzsche. It also lacked the nuance of his explanation to Brandes. 
 Hansson made amends. In 1891, he published a book, also in German, 
entitled Das Junge Skandinavien. Vier Essays von Ola Hansson. The 
first essay of this collection was about Georg Brandes. Its content was a 
pastiche of material that Hansson had previously published in the Berlin 
newspaper, Freie Bühne, and Nietzscheanismus in Skandinavien.
However, there is one striking emendation in the text. Although Strind-
berg served as the emblem of the conversion of the northern elite to 
Nietzscheanism in Nietzscheanismus in Skandinavien, in Hansson’s 
1891 essay on Brandes’ influence on Scandinavian literature Strindberg is 
given the ambiguous status of being a follower who anticipated that 
which he was to follow: 
Och i detta ögonblick finns det väl ingen kulturheros, på vilken det unga 
Skandinaviens ögon blicka med sådan tro som på Nietzsche, vilken Brandes 
genom sitt föredrag först gjort känd i vidsträckte kretsar. Till honom bekänner 
sig bland andra även Sveriges största diktarsnille, August Strindberg, varom 
flera av hans diktningar bära vittnesbörd, isynnerhet novellen De små, – 
skriven, innan Brandes introducerad den tyska diktar-filosofen i Norden –, 
samt romanerna Tschandala och I havsbandet.
(And in that moment there was no other cultural hero other than Nietzsche 
whom »Young Sweden« could gaze at with such belief, and Brandes had first 
————
were sitting in a carousel. Everything is spinning. But I assume that this man should be 
read thoroughly and more than once. I lack that Archimedian point, a stable factual 
base. In its entirety, it seems a fantastic hanging garden for me. Will you, when I send 
these books back, lend me a new charge of the same kind. My translation. According to 
Ingvar Holm in Ola Hansson. En studie I åttiotalsromantik, even though Hansson 
had previously read Zur Genealogy der Moral, his interest in Nietzsche did not begin in 
earnest until a visit to Strindberg in Holte in November of 1888. See HOLM: 1957, 118.
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made him familiar in a wide circle. Sweden’s greatest poetic genius, August 
Strindberg, even can be counted among those who profess for Nietzsche. Sev-
eral of his works provide testimony of this, particularly the novella The Small,
written before Brandes introduced the German poet-philosopher to the North 
–, as well as the novels Tschandala and By the Open Sea.)78
The importance of Hansson’s commentary on Strindberg’s relationship to 
Nietzschean thought resides in that his comments set the tone for the 
scholarship that followed. Hansson registered both Strindberg’s enthusi-
asm and his ambivalence towards Nietzsche in two discrete moments, 
providing future scholars with a contradictory base on which to build. 
His own fluctuating statements on the degree of influence which was 
exerted upon Strindberg by Nietzsche has left a paradoxical legacy. The 
scholarship has stilled the fluctuation of Hansson’s position and negated 
the possibility of influence. It has relied instead on readings of the psy-
chological implications of the contents of the correspondence or a map-
ping of a monolithic notion of conceptual congruity onto Strindberg’s 
production. Instead, I have suggested that the correspondence bares the 
mechanism of Strindberg and Nietzsche’s formal notions of self-
construction expressed by their formulation of the construction of a per-
sonal history, which includes a reaction to the force of their encounter. 
 Hansson’s agenda certainly had an effect on his reading of the en-
counter between the two. However, his agenda was split. Hansson 
wanted to establish himself as a German writer and was calling for a pan-
Germanic cultural revival of which he considered himself to be part. He 
also valued his relationship to Strindberg, was a great admirer of the 
older man’s work, and the two shared some literary affinities. Hansson’s 
private relationship with Strindberg caused him to amend his public 
statement on the latter’s relationship to Nietzsche. 
 The first and only German book devoted entirely to Strindberg’s rela-
tionship to Nietzsche was written by an acquaintance of Strindberg’s in 
1921. Karl Strecker’s Nietzsche und Strindberg. Mit ihrem Briefwechsel 
————
78  This essay was reprinted in a Swedish translation in HANSSON: 1921b. The essay in 
question is entitled »Den nya riktningen (Georg Brandes)« and is found on pages 7–22.
On pages 21–22, after praising Brandes’ role of bringing an element of German fertility to 
Scandinavian culture through his early Hegelianism and later Nietzscheanism, Hansson 
wrote the lines you see in the body above. Though the change is subtle, Hansson has 
modified his language to suggest continuity in Strindberg’s work. See my discussion of 
Hansson’s paradox of continuity and renewal in the excursus that precedes this chapter. 
The translation of the passage is mine. 
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(Nietzsche and Strindberg. With their Correspondence) reads as a 
proto-fascist paean to the German spirit. Strecker transformed Strindberg 
into a pan-German writer and gave him equal status with Nietzsche as 
they played a rather peculiar role in this writer’s imagination: that of two 
stars shining brightly in the firmament, shedding light upon the »Zeit-
geist« at the end of the nineteenth century.79 Strecker writes, »Germani-
sche Freiheitsgefühle und germanische Unrast sind in ungewöhnlicher 
Stärke die eigentümlichen Wertemale dieser beiden Genien.« (A German 
sense of freedom and Germanic restlessness are to an unusual extent the 
characteristics of both of these geniuses.« 80 Despite the pathos of 
Strecker’s ideologically intoxicated prose, this was the first time that the 
letters between Strindberg and Nietzsche were collected. 
 The value of this book derives from Strecker’s personal recollection as 
an eyewitness and in his contemporaneity to Strindberg. His recollections 
reinforce the notion of Strindberg’s identification with Nietzsche’s work. 
»Er sagte mir 1892 in Berlin, ›Nietzsche hat allein dafür die Worte gefun-
den, was ich im letzten Jahrzehnt gefühlt und gedacht habe‹.« (In Berlin 
in 1892 he said to me: ›Nietzsche alone has found the words for what I 
have felt and thought in the last decade‹.)81 This allows us an insight into 
how Strindberg expressed his own view of the impact of the encounter 
while he was in Germany and trying to establish himself as a German 
author. The fluidity of Strindberg’s own notion of his past becomes ap-
parent when Strecker tells the story behind this book. This story is worth 
repeating.
 Strecker knew Strindberg from his Berlin days. He hadn’t seen him 
since 1892, but in 1909 he wrote Strindberg to ask for his Nietzsche corre-
spondence. Strindberg was living in Stockholm at the time and was ex-
periencing a level of acceptance in his homeland that would have been 
beyond his expectations in 1892. Strindberg had suffered through his years 
of wandering and poverty. Now, even his previously unpublished work 
was finding its way to the reading public. In October of 1909, he wrote an 
introduction to the fourth section of his autobiography, Tjänstekvinnans
son (Son of a Servant). The book was written in 1886, but was first find-
————
79  »Nietzsche und Strindberg sind die beiden selbstständigsten, stärksten und ein-
flussreichsten Geister am Ende des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts.« STRECKER: 1921, 11.
80  Ibid., 99. Translation mine. 
81  Ibid., 64. Translation mine. 
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ing its way to the booksellers. This introduction consisted mostly of a 
listing of his works in chronological order. At the end of the section for 
the 1880’s, he wrote: »I havsbandet. Nietzsches Filosofi influerar; men 
Individen går under i strävan till den absoluta Individualismen. Inleder 
90-talet: Übermensch.« (By the Open Sea. Nietzsche’s philosophy influ-
ences; but the individual succumbs (goes under) in the striving for abso-
lute individuality. Introduces the 90’s: Übermensch.) 82 This simple 
statement alerts us to the change in Strindberg’s understanding of his 
own past: the influence of Nietzsche is concentrated in the form of a 
novel, and the text tells the story of the failure of the individual to attain 
an absolute individuality. This leads to his downfall and introduces the 
work of the 1890’s. This statement indicates that Strindberg’s ideological 
predisposition at that moment, his »violent individualism«83 had now 
given way to a notion that the hubris of the individual would be punished 
by powers, which were external and provided the grammar for the limits 
of individual freedom.84 This change was reflected in his response to 
Strecker as well. 
 Strindberg replied to Strecker’s request on January 30, 1909:
Es handelt sich in meinem Briefwechsel mit Nietzsche u. a. um eine Überset-
zung ins Französische, die ich von seinen Schriften machen sollte, und da ich 
verarmt war, konnte ich das nicht umsonst – also die ewige ungemütliche 
Geldfrage. Aber inzwischen sandte ich ihm die franzsösiche Übersetzung mei-
ner ›Friedensnovelle‹, Tortures de Conscience, Samvetskval. Bald darauf 
wurde er wahnsinnig und schrieb mir ungefähr folgendes: »Ihre Novelle hat 
auf mich wie ein Flintenschuß gewirkt. Ich gehe nach Rom um drei Monar-
chen totzuschießen.« (Es war nämlich damals eine Konferenz in Rom.) 
»Der Gekreuzigte« 
Ich glaube, dass er mit mir Spaß machen wollte und sandte den Brief an Dr. 
Georg Brandes. Brandes antwortete, daß er die »Katastrophe schon längst er-
wartet habe.« Später bekam ich noch eine Zeile, ungefähr so: »Leben Sie 
wohl, Divorçons!« 
(My translation of his writings into French is the subject matter of my corre-
spondence with Nietzsche, among other things. As I was impoverished, I could 
not do this for free – thus the eternally unpleasant money question. In be-
tween, I sent him the French translation of my »peace-novella,« Pangs of 
Conscience. Shortly after that, he went insane and wrote me something like 
————
82  STRINDBERG: 1996a, The introduction is found on pp. 263–267. My translation. 
83  See BORLAND: 1956, 24.
84  This change in Strindberg’s ideology, however, is not a change in his understanding 
of the process of identity formation. This issue will be discussed in the last chapter of 
this study through a reading of Strindberg’s Inferno and Nietzsche’s Ecce Homo.
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this: »Your novella has affected me like a gunshot. I will travel to Rome to as-
sassinate three monarchs. (Namely, there was a conference there at the time). 
»The Crucified« 
I believe that he wanted to fool around with me and I sent the letter to Dr. 
Georg Brandes. Brandes answered that »he had already long expected the ca-
tastrophe.« Another time I received a note that read something like: Live well, 
let us be divorced.)85
 There are some subtle yet telling discrepancies in Strindberg’s recol-
lection of the letters. Four points emerge from a comparison of Strind-
berg’s version of the story and the primary source documents. These are 
as follows: a transposition, a rewording to advantage, an omission, and a 
distancing.
 When Strindberg sent Nietzsche his peace novella. Nietzsche respon-
ded:
Sie werden die Antwort auf ihre Novelle in Kürze zu hören bekommen – sie 
klingt wie ein Flintenschuß … Ich habe einen Fürstentag nach Rom zusam-
menbefohlen, ich will den jungen Kaiser füsilieren lassen. 
Auf Wiedersehn! Denn wir werden uns wieder sehen … Une seule condition: 
Divorçons …
Nietzsche Caesar
(You will soon have an answer about your novella – it sounds like a rifle 
shot … I have ordered a convocation of princes in Rome – I mean to have the 
young emperor shot. 
Auf Wiedersehen! For we shall see each other again. Under one condition: let 
us divorce … 
Nietzsche Caesar)86
First, Strindberg confuses two signatures. In the letter, which refers to the 
peace novella, Nietzsche did not sign off as »Der Gekreuzigte,« but 
rather as »Nietzsche Caesar«. Second, Strindberg’s version of Nietzsche’s 
response implied that he had had an explosive effect (Aufwirkung) on the 
philosopher. Nietzsche’s actual response was much more ironic. He 
wrote that the answer to the peace novella would be heard and that it, 
with it being a bit ambiguous as both die Antwort and die Novelle are 
feminine, would sound like a gunshot. The irony here is unmistakable as 
the answer to Strindberg’s pacifist novel sounds (klingt) as if it comes out 
of the barrel of a gun. Also, further accentuating the irony, Nietzsche 
————
85  STRECKER: 1921, 27. Translation mine. 
86  NIETZSCHE: 1984a, 567–568. The English translation is from MIDDLETON: 1996, 344.
Note: Middleton does not translate the French – so the last line of the letter is my trans-
lation.
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wore the mask of the martial Caesar, not the peaceful Christ, and ordered 
a march on Rome. Thirdly, Strindberg neglected to mention his own 
answer to Nietzsche’s letter where he cites Horace’s Carmina II number 
10, and added »Interdum juvat insaniere« (Meanwhile let us rejoice in 
our madness),87 signing off as »Strindberg (Deus, optimus, maximus),«88
thereby upping the ante. To this Nietzsche replied in the beginning of 
January: »Eheu? … Nicht mehr Divorçons … Der Gekreuzigte.«89 Lastly, 
Strindberg recalled correctly that he had sent Brandes the letter and ques-
tioned Nietzsche’s sanity; however, he forgot that he had put forward the 
proposition that Nietzsche was mad, and, out of fear that he would be 
compromised by association, asked for Brandes’ advice.90 Brandes re-
plied the very next day. In his response he reminded Strindberg that he 
had criticized Nietzsche’s »svulmende Selvfølelse« (swelling sense of 
self)91 and that Strindberg had defended Nietzsche. Brandes went on to 
speculate if Nietzsche were really mad and expressed sorrow that such a 
rich spirit could be beset by megalomania. Strindberg also forgot to men-
tion that Brandes’ lack of surprise at Nietzsche’s condition was expressed 
in the following manner: 
Lidt Haab har jeg dog endnu. Naar man som jeg i mere end en Snes Aar er 
gaaet om som Doctor i det store Hospital af syge, saarede, exalterede og 
halvfjottede Forfængeligheder, som kaldes Literaturen – forbauses man ikke 
mere over nogen Ytring af Selv-tilbedelse hos en Skribent, især en længe 
miskjendt.
(Despite this, I still have little hope. When one has, as I have, played doctor in 
the great literary hospital filled with sick, wounded, exalted, and half-wittedly 
vain individuals for more than a score of years, – then one is not astonished 
————
87  Translation from MIDDLETON: 1996, 344.
88  STRINDBERG: 1961, letter 1739.
89  NIETZSCHE: 1984a, 572. The irony is even further compounded here – Nietzsche’s 
farewell signature is in response to Strindberg’s signature in the previous letter: »Strind-
berg (Deus, Optimus, Maximus),« so we have »Der Gekreuzige (The Crucified)« asking 
for a divorce from God. 
90  BRANDES, E., and G. BRANDES: 1952–1956, 296. Letter from Strindberg to Georg 
Brandes, January 3, 1889. »… nu tror jag vår vän Nietzsche är galen och hvad värre är, 
han kan kompromettera oss, såvida den listige Slaven (minns Turgenjeff-Daudet, tänk 
på den slipade Tolstoi) skojar med oss allesamman! … Was Thun?« (… now I believe 
our friend Nietzsche is mad and what is even worse, he can compromise us, provided 
that sly Slav (remember Turgenev-Daudet, think about that cunning Tolstoy) is putting 
us all on … What is to be done? My translation.
91  Ibid. Georg Brandes to Strindberg. 
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any more over some expression of self-worship by an author, especially one 
who has long been suspected.) 92
Strindberg failed to recall how Brandes’ assessment of Nietzsche’s condi-
tion was tied into his notion of the literary environment as a whole, and, 
recalling how Brandes had introduced Strindberg as a half-crazed but 
true genius, by association back to Strindberg himself. Strindberg dis-
tanced himself from his own fear of being perceived as mad. Another 
form of distancing also took place. Strindberg told Strecker that Brandes 
had the letters, completely forgetting that Brandes had sent the letters 
back. Strecker wrote Brandes, who informed him of Strindberg’s mistake. 
It is interesting that Strindberg placed the correspondence in the hands of 
the one who made it possible. 
 While Strecker has been merely seen as a curiosity and Ola Hansson’s 
pan-German agenda faded with time, the closeness of Hansson’s rela-
tionship to Strindberg added weight to his statements for future scholars. 
The two men’s disagreement over the extent of Nietzsche’s influence and 
their correspondence about their reception of the philosopher was to 
become a staple of the Scandinavian and German scholarship on the 
subject.
 The scholarship has resolved the disagreement between the two per-
spectives by smoothing it out and deeming Strindberg’s encounter with 
Nietzsche to be a passing phase in the life of the Swede and a document 
of the philosopher’s imminent demise. 
 Parting company with these lines of thought, I claim that the incon-
gruities that face the teller of this tale provide us with an opening through 
which we can discern its significance. It is these incongruities that exem-
plify the commonality in Strindberg and Nietzsche’s projects. This com-
monality can be found on the level of the construction of subjectivity. 
Both Nietzsche and Strindberg share a notion of subjectivity that denies a 
sense of foundation. Recollection is in dynamic tension with forgetting, 
as the self knows no stable history. The construction of self is dependent 
upon a struggle between forces in a polemical present tense. Both men 
share the notion of character as fiction, see historical conditions as an 
internalized imperative to re-interpret, and valorize the fluidity of this 
interpretative optic dependent only on the interests of the organism in 
ceaseless reformation. Contradiction, the saying against what was previ-
————
92  Ibid., 297.
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ously said, replaces the notion of a stable self. Thus, our version of the 
story begins at a moment when the past is a point of contention. This 
choice is appropriate to our subject matter. For the crux of the encounter 
between Nietzsche and Strindberg is the commonality in the way that 
they bare the device of their reconstruction of both a personal and a cul-
tural history. The self is a site of conflict, and self-interpretation is shown 
to be a reconstructive process, which changes the past, by its very enact-
ment.
 Appropriately, the first problem that arises in the telling of the story of 
the encounter between the two men is the conflict between the public 
and the private Strindberg. This conflict is magnified when we factor in 
August Strindberg’s fluid conception of his own past. It is even further 
complicated when we consider Strindberg’s project in the light of bour-
geois realism, which claims to make the private lives of its class of readers 
transparent to themselves. Strindberg radicalized this project by making 
himself and his own private life the subject of an autobiographical project 
written in the form of fiction. In other words, he made the fiction of his 
own private life public. This left him with only one truth claim, the para-
doxical and mutable claim of being both an aspect of continuity and re-
newal. He became by his own reckoning, the modern. 
I senare tiden spridda uppgifter att mitt skriftställeri skulle vara baserat på 
Nietzsche, utan vidare, ber jag här få besvara. 
(Recently, there have been scattered reports that my authorship is based on 
Nietzsche. Without further ado, I ask permission to respond here.)93
In 1894, a group of Scandinavian authors published a collection of essays 
written about Strindberg. Included in this collection was a terse two-page 
article by Strindberg himself. The title of his contribution is Mitt förhål-
lande till Nietzsche (My Relationship to Nietzsche). It is interesting that 
Strindberg chose to comment upon a »relationship« which was both 
short-lived and impossible to rekindle. Yet in this strategically placed 
apologia, Strindberg elected to respond to a perception that he had 
helped to create and at one time had hoped to exploit. As Gunnar 
Brandell has remarked about Strindberg’s Berlin years: 
————
93  STRINDBERG: 1918, 323–324, Mitt förhållande till Nietzsche (My Relationship to 
Nietzsche). Originally published in En bok om Strindberg (A Book about Strindberg)
in 1894.
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Ola Hansson och Georg Brandes i kompanjonskap hade också för tyskarna 
tolkat en av deras landsmän, den nyupptäckte filosofen Friedrich Nietzsche. 
Till Strindbergs rykte hörde att han hade varit i kontakt med den märklige 
mannen, vilket inte skadade hans sak. Vid ett tillfälle sökte han efter 
Nietzschebreven för att visa upp dem i krog eller salong, glömsk av att hade 
lämnat dem kvar i Stockholm. 
(Ola Hansson and Georg Brandes had in concert interpreted one of the Ger-
mans’ countrymen for them, the newly discovered philosopher Friedrich 
Nietzsche. Strindberg had been in contact with this remarkable man and this 
enhanced his reputation. It certainly did not hurt his case. When the opportu-
nity arose, he searched for his Nietzsche letters to show them off in a bar or sa-
lon, forgetful that he had left them behind in Stockholm.)94
Strindberg had at one time hoped to gain recognition for his association 
with Nietzsche and wanted to ride the wave of the growing enthusiasm 
for the philosopher in Germany.95 This association with Nietzsche helped 
pave the way for Strindberg when he traveled to Berlin in 1892. Disap-
pointed with his lack of success at home, Strindberg had hoped to be-
come known as a pan-German author.96 This article, which was written 
after Strindberg had decided to try his hand as a scientist in France, re-
flected another interest. Strindberg now wanted to be seen as a scientist 
and in literature as a scientific author who had experimented upon him-
self and had anticipated his own development. In any case, Strindberg 
seems split between allure of momentary ambitions and the weight of his 
by any standards interesting past. 
 The burden of this past, populated with letters of intoxicated indul-
gence about Friedrich Nietzsche, was lifted through a public appeal; 
————
94  BRANDELL: 1985, 287.
95  Or at least, Strindberg’s understanding of the German cultural situation was influ-
enced by Hansson whose residence in Berlin predated his own. Hansson wrote 
Strindberg on April 8, 1890: »Alla tyska publikationer ha nu i en hast blifvet fulla af 
Nietzsche.« My translation. »All the German publications have suddenly become filled 
with Nietzsche.« Ola Hansson: Letter to August Strindberg collected in STRINDBERG:
1938.
96  Strindberg, in fact, would find a more receptive audience in Germany than at 
home. Directors such as Max Reinhardt were much more willing to stage some of Strind-
berg’s more controversial plays than his own countryman. A good example: After the 
turn of the century, Max Reinhardt established a Strindberg repertoire which premiered 
new plays and staged some of the older, more controversial dramas. Fröken Julie, writ-
ten in the summer of 1888, was part of a series of Strindberg productions staged by 
Reinhardt. It played to great success at the Kleines Theater in Berlin in 1904. Its Swedish 
premiere was in 1906 – in Lund – a production directed by a young actor, August Falck, 
in a prominent but small university town, staged far away from the capital. 
THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF INFLUENCE 175
explained away in a series of terse statements, which read like a chroni-
cle. Strindberg claimed that what had been regarded as the Nietzschean 
strain in his work was, in fact, a continuation of the train of thought that 
had begun in 1886 with the writing of the fourth volume of his autobiog-
raphy, Tjänstekvinnans son (Son of a Servant). With the writing of För-
fattaren (The Author), he claims to have »arbetat mig ur äldre vantro, 
invuxen från ungdomen« (worked myself out of older false beliefs inher-
ited from my youth).97 He continues by echoing his 1889 admonition 
against Hansson’s Nietzscheanismus in Skandinavien by mentioning 
that he had published Die Kleinen (The Small) in the Neue Freie Presse.
But there is a significant change in this retrospective public echo, which 
in the passing of time resounds to the point where we hear the echo of an 
echo and so on. For here, the site of the confluence between Strindberg 
and Nietzsche’s thought branches out into a few more tributaries, and the 
protest that Strindberg lodged against Hansson converges with his state-
ment to Georg Brandes that he would experiment with a Nietzschean 
perspective. The texts that Strindberg had presented to Hansson in de-
fense of his intellectual autonomy multiply in Mitt förhållande till 
Nietzsche. Schleichwege has been forgotten, but Die Großen (The
Great) and Kampf der Gehirne (Battle of the Brains) are added to the 
list of texts published in the Viennese newspaper. Fadren (The Father)
and the novel Hemsöborna (The People of Hemsö) are also mentioned 
as being part of an experiment in which the Nietzschean perspective was 
tentatively enacted.98
 The chronicle continues by addressing the events of the next year, 
1888, by stating that his war of liberation99 continued and that Fröken
Julie (Miss Julie) furnishes the proof that he had come upon the same 
results as Nietzsche, who was completely unknown to him at the time.100
————
97  STRINDBERG: 1918, 323, »Mitt förhållande till Nietzsche«. My translation.
98  Ibid. »… och hade 1887, i de av Neue Freie Presse tryckta novellerna Die Kleinen,
Die Großen och Kampf des Gehirnes samt i dramat Fadren och romanen Hemsöborna
försöksvis intagit den ståndpunkt som numera betecknas som Nietzsches.« (… and had 
in 1887 through the publishing of Die Kleinen, Die Grossen, and Kampf des Gehirnes
in the Neue Freie Presse, as well as in the drama The Father and the novel The People 
of Hemsö took in the Nietzschean perspective by way of experiment.) My translation.
99  Ibid. Befrielsekriget is the term used. 
100 Fröken Julie is known in English as either Miss Julie or Lady Julie, depending on 
the translation. It is germane to note, that while Strindberg uses this play as an example 
of his anticipation of Nietzsche, the foreword to the play was written after Strindberg 
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The encounter itself and how it came to be is dealt with tersely. Mitt för-
hållande till Nietzsche concludes: »De som följt min skriftställarebana i 
dess utvecklingsskeden veta åtminstone alltför väl huru tidigt jag intog 
den s. k. Nietzscheståndpunkten gentemot konventionell moral och 
kvinnoemancipation, för att de ej skola med rena samveten giva mig mitt 
och Nietzsche sitt.« (Those who have followed the trajectory of my au-
thorship in this stage of development know at least all too well how early 
I took the so called Nietzschean perspective on conventional morality 
and feminism, so that they could not with a clean conscience not give me 
what is mine and Nietzsche what is his.)101 The protest ends with a call for 
separation, and the scholarship has up to now heeded this call. In 
Strindberg’s first, last, and only public statement on his encounter with 
Nietzsche, he set the stage for a series of scholars who posit the impossi-
bility of influence. Yet, through a condensation of his own past in the 
interests of his momentary ambitions, Strindberg pointed once again to 
the relation between separation and identity formation. The struggle of 
being modern, of creating lasting things in a sea of change, had replaced 
the desire to depict what is real. Strindberg based his notion of selfhood 
on an oscillation between distance and proximity, this movement recon-
structing and inflecting the past, making it present through a polemical 
voice, all the while reclaiming experience through naming. The question 
for Strindberg was not whether to be or not to be Nietzschean. For him, 
it was more the paradox of both being and not being Nietzschean that 
held sway and perhaps this is the most Nietzschean response of all. 
————
had read the philosopher. It is in this foreword that Strindberg introduces his notion of 
the characterless character. Strindberg admits that the foreword was written under the 
influence of Nietzsche. I would claim that the foreword is interesting in that it provides 
us with a window through which we can see how Strindberg re-evaluated his own pre-
Nietzschean, »Nietzschean play« post Nietzsche.
101  STRINDBERG: 1918, 324, »Mitt förhållande till Nietzsche«.
